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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. sec. 78A-3-102(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1: Whether the jury properly concluded that Defendant/Appellant Canberra 
Development Company, LC ("Canberra") and Defendant/Appellant David J. Allen 
("Allen") are liable for fraudulent nondisclosure to Plaintiffs/Appellees Mark and 
Marilyn Hess (collectively "the Hesses"). Standard of Review: The "burden on an 
appellant to establish that the evidence does not support the jury's verdict... is quite 
heavy." Pratt v. Prodata, Inc , 885 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 1994). To "successfully attack 
the verdict, an appellant must marshal all the evidence supporting the verdict and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to that verdict, 
the evidence is not sufficient to support it." Id. 
ISSUE 2: Whether the trial court correctly concluded that the Hesses need not provide 
expert testimony to prove their fraudulent nondisclosure claims against Canberra and 
Allen. Standard of Review: This is a question of law, which this Court reviews "for 
correctness." Downing v HylandPharm , 2008 UT 65. ^  5, 194 P.3d 944. 946. 
ISSUE 3: Whether the trial court properly denied Canberra and Allen's motion to 
dismiss Ms. Hess's claims for fraudulent nondisclosure. Standard of Review: A district 
court's denial of a motion to dismiss is a "legal determination" that this Court "review [s] 
for correctness." Mack v Utah State Dep }t of Commerce, 2009 UT 47, f12, 221 P.3d 
194, 198. 
ISSUE 4: Whether the trial court rightly denied Canberra and Allen* s JNOV. 
1 
Standard of Review: This Court will reverse a trial court's denial of a JNOV "only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the [Hesses]/' the Court "concludes 
that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict." Hall v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc , 
959 P.2d 109. 111 (Utah 1998). And "in order to prevail, the appealing party must 
marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Id 
ISSUE 5: Whether the trial court ruled correctly on Canberra and Allen's jury 
instruction regarding intervening/superseding cause. Standard of Review: Whether a trial 
court's refusal to give a "proposed jury instruction constitutes error is a question of law, 
which [this Court] review[s] for correctness/' Brewer v Denver & Rio Grande W RR , 
2001 UT 77, % 38, 31 P.3d 557, 571. But "it is not error [for a court] to refuse a proposed 
jury instruction if the point is properly covered in other instructions." Id The Court 
reviews jury instructions "in their entirety and will affirm when the instructions taken as a 
whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case." Id 
ISSUE 6: Whether the trial court properly denied Canberra and Allen's motion for 
remittitur. Standard of Review: The Court applies an "abuse of discretion standard in 
reviewing a trial judge's decision to grant or deny a remittitur on the amount of 
compensatory damages." Smith v Fairfax Realty, Inc . 2003 UT 41, f^ 25, 82 P.3d 1064, 
1070. Under this standard of review, the Court "will reverse only if there is no 
reasonable basis for the decision." Id 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about May 24, 2005, Mark and Marilyn Hess sued Tracy Smith and GTS 
2 
Construction, Inc., the contractor who built the Hesses' home. (R. at 1-55.) The Hesses 
alleged fraudulent concealment, fraudulent nondisclosure, breach of warranty, breach of 
contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. at 1-55.) On or 
about November 4, 2005, the Hesses filed an amended complaint in which they added 
Defendant Canberra Development to the suit. (R. at 283-343.) Against Canberra, the 
Hesses alleged fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent misrepresentation. (R. at 283-
343.) On or about April 20, 2007, the Hesses filed a second amended complaint in which 
they added Defendant David J. Allen to the claims of fraudulent nondisclosure and 
fraudulent misrepresentation. (R. at 1711-25.) All parties ultimately settled, except for 
Canberra and Allen. (R. at 4678:454, 475.) 
The Honorable Fred D. Howard presided over the four-day jury trial on September 
29, October 1-3, 2008. (R. at 3437-38, 3525-26, 3527-28, 3529-30.) The jury returned 
its verdict on the evening of October 3, 2008. (R. at 4678:771-90.) As to the Hesses' 
fraudulent nondisclosure claim, the jury found for the Hesses and against both Canberra 
and Allen.1 (R. at 3748.) As to Mr. Hess's fraudulent misrepresentation claim, the jury 
found for the Hesses and against both Canberra and Allen.2 (R. at 3747.) The jury 
awarded the following damages to the Hesses: $10,617.68 as damages "for costs relating 
1
 The jury also found "from clear and convincing evidence" that both Canberra 
and Allen's "actions in relation to the Hesses' fraudulent nondisclosure claims were the 
result of willful amd malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that 
manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the rights of 
the Hesses," which would have supported an award of punitive damages. (R. at 3748.) 
As with the fraudulent nondisclosure claim, the jury found that both Canberra 
and Allen's conduct rose to the level justifying punitive damages. See footnote 1, supra. 
3 
to the Hesses discovering the defects in their home and property"; $319,439.62° as 
damages "for repairs to the Hesses' home that have already been incurred"; $206,692.70 
as damages "for repairs to the Hesses' home that have yet to be incurred"; and 
$2,625,000 as damages "for mental or emotional distress as a result of Defendants 
Canberra and/or Allen's fraudulent nondisclosure and/or fraudulent misrepresentation," 
(r. at 3746); for a grand total of $3,172,367.68. 
The jury also apportioned the damages: 35% to Allen, 45% to Canberra, 17% to 
GTS Construction, 0% to DaM Construction, 2% to Earthtec Testing and Engineering, 
and 1% to the Hesses. (R. at 3745.) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS4 
Canberra and Allen Develop the Last Phase of the Canberra Subdivision, and 
They Obtain the AGEC Report which Warns of Collapsible Soils in the Development 
In early 1997, Canberra and Allen sought to develop the last phase of the Canberra 
Development in Lindon, Utah. (R. at 4678:610-11.) Before developing the property, 
they hired Applied Geotechnical Engineering Consultants, Inc. ("AGEC") to perform a 
geotechnical analysis5 of this last phase, which included lot 41, the lot the Hesses would 
ultimately purchase. (R. at 4678:610-11.) (Canberra and Allen had previously obtained 
J
 The jury actually awarded $330,057.30 for damages already incurred. (R. at 
3746.) This was a simple math error on the jury's part. The jury inadvertently included 
the $10,617.68 it had already awarded for costs to discover the defects in the award for 
repairs already incurred. During a post-trial hearing, the Hesses stipulated to remit the 
amount awarded for repairs already incurred by $10,617.68. 
4
 As the appellees, the Hesses "recite the facts in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict." Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 794 (Utah 1991). 
5
 A geotechnical analysis is a three to six week study that costs about $3000 to 
$5000. (R. at 4677: 188.) It provides "precautions and details [about the land] for the 
construction of actual structures that would later be built." (R. at 4678: 522.) 
4 
"[s]even or eight" other subdivision-wide soils reports for other phases of the Canberra 
development. (R. at 4678:610.)) 
On April 3, 1997, AGEC provided Canberra and Allen with its report ("AGEC 
Report") (copy attached as Addendum A.)6 The AGEC Report contained warnings and 
recommendations for future homeowners to be aware of and follow prior to building their 
homes. On the second page of the AGEC Report, titled "conclusions," AGEC 
highlighted the most critical warnings and recommendations, including the following: 
"[r]ecommendalions contained in this report should be carefully followed^ and 
^[m]oisture sensitive soils have been reported in the area. Precautions with respect to 
constructing in moisture sensitive soil areas are included in this report" (Add. A, p. 
2.) (Emphases added.) 
The AGEC Report contained a more detailed analysis and expanded on these 
warnings and recommendations. For example, AGEC forewarned that: 
• "With the known erratic occurrence [of bad soils at the site], we suggest that the 
owners be aware of the potentially moisture sensitive soils in the area and that the 
excavation observations and drainage precautions contained in the geotechnical 
recommendations of this report be carefully followed." (Add. A, p. 10.) 
• "The sprinkler lines and sprinkler heads should not be places within 10 feet of the 
foundation walls/' (Add. A, p. 13.) 
• "If wetting of the foundation soil occurs, footing settlement could be significantly 
greater [than 1 inch]." (Add. A, p. 13.) 
6
 The trial court received the AGEC Report as Exhibit 2 at trial. (R. at 3641.) 
• Test pit 12, which contained collapsible soils, was located on lot 41, which would 
eventually be the Hesses5 lot. (Add. A, fig. 2.) 
Allen knew about the collapsible soils and other problems in the development 
because he "read through that report [the AGEC Report] . . . ." (R. at 4678: 612.) He 
also testified that he specifically read the "conclusions" section of the report: "[t]he 
conclusion page was what I was very interested in." (R. at 4678: 612.) 
Mr. Steven Tanner was Canberra's vice president and exclusive real estate agent 
for the Canberra development. (R. at 4675:73; 4678:524.) By the time he was selling 
lots in this last phase, he had received copies of the AGEC Report from Canberra. (R. at 
4675:79-80.) Canberra and Allen did not instruct Mr. Tanner to give the AGEC Report 
to potential buyers: "I did not receive any instructions [on what to do with the AGEC 
Report]." (R. at 4675:80.) Mr. Tanner testified that unless a potential buyer specifically 
asked him for a geotechnical report, Mr. Tanner did not disclose the AGEC Report, even 
though he carried several copies with him. (R. at 4675:79-81.) 
Mr. Tanner also testified that he "glanced" at the AGEC Report, but "not being an 
engineer^ he] wouldn't know what all the terms meant." (R. at 4675:97.) But upon 
inquiry whether he understood the AGEC Report's recommendations, such as to grade 
the surface to drain away from the home and to put downspouts beyond the foundation of 
the home, Mr. Tanner conceded that "it's not all that complicated" and that he could 
"follow those [recommendations]. . . . " (R. at 4675:98.) He even went a step further and 
said, "[the recommendations in the AGEC Report are] something that builders need to 
know about, I suppose." (R. at 4675:98.) 
6 
Canberra and Allen Fail to Disclose the AGEC Report to the Hesses 
In early 2004, Mark and Marilyn Hess wanted to build their dream home. They 
drove through Lindon and saw the Canberra development. (R. at 4677:258-59.) The 
Hesses took a brochure from the "for sale" sign, and they called Mr. Steven Tanner, 
Canberra's vice president and real estate agent. (R. at 4677:259; 4675:73; 4678:524.) 
Mr. Tanner and the Hesses subsequently met to discuss lots in the Canberra 
development. (R. at 4675:83.) Not knowing about the AGEC Report—which showed 
collapsible soils on lot 41—the Hesses made an offer on lot 41 for $150,000, Canberra's 
asking price. (R. at 4677:259-60.) Canberra accepted, and the Hesses gave Mr. Tanner a 
$1,000 check as an earnest money deposit, and Mr. Tanner presented it to Allen. (R. at 
4675:82-83.) Mr. Tanner did not disclose the AGEC Report—or the fact that there were 
collapsible soils in the development—to the Hesses. (R. at 4677:260; 4675:91.) 
Mr. Hess signed the real estate purchase contract ("REPC) and the seller's 
property condition disclosure on or about February 21, 2004. (R. at 4677:260-61.) 
(Copies of the REPC and the seller's disclosure form are attached as Addendum B and 
Addendum C, respectively.)7 Defendant David J. Allen initialed and signed those two 
documents a couple days later, on February 23, 2004. (R. at 4675:78-79.) (Add. B, C.) 
Apart from simply disclosing the AGEC Report to the Hesses, Canberra and Allen 
had several opportunities to notify the Hesses of the collapsible soils in the development 
in the seller's disclosure form. For example, on the second page of the disclosure form, it 
7
 The trial court received the REPC as Exhibit 6 at trial, and the court received the 
seller's disclosure form as Exhibit 7 at trial. (R. at 3641.) 
7 
asked Canberra and Allen if there was "anything else which you should disclose to [the 
Hesses] because it may materially or adversely affect the value or desirability of the 
Property?'' (Add. C.) There are several blank lines on which Canberra and Allen could 
have written in "see AGEC Report" or given the Hesses some similar warning about 
collapsible soils. But Canberra and Allen left the lines blank. (Add. C.) 
Directly above the signature line for Canberra and Allen, it stated: "SELLER 
REPRESENTS THAT, TO THE BEST OF SELLER'S KNOWLEDGE, THE 
INFORMATION SET FORTH IN THE FOREGOING DISCLOSURE STATEMENT IS 
ACCURATE AND COMPLETE." (Add. C.) Allen signed on the line immediately 
below this statement. 
Mr. Hess read the seller's disclosure form carefully, and he understood that, he 
could "cancel the whole transaction" if he discovered something adverse in the seller's 
disclosure. (R. at 4677:264.) Because Defendants did not truthfully complete the form, 
Mr. Hess did not see anything in the disclosure form that worried him. (R. at 4677:264.) 
The Hesses eventually paid Canberra/Allen, and Allen signed the warranty deed 
conveying the property to Mark Hess and Marilyn Hess on April 1, 2004. (R. at 
4677:265.) (A copy of the warranty deed is attached hereto as Addendum D.) 
At no time before closing on the lot did Canberra, Allen, or Mr. Tanner provide 
the AGEC Report to the Hesses or tell the Hesses that such a geotechnical report existed. 
(R. at 4677:266.) Moreover, Canberra and Allen did not disclose that there were serious 
soil problems in the development generally, or specifically on lot 41. (R. at 4677:266.) 
The Hesses' Home Settles Dramatically 
8 
The Hesses' home was completed in January 2005. (R. at 4677:295.) Shortly 
after moving in, there were "some little things with [sticking] doors," but the "major 
problems were in the end of March [of 2005]." (R. at 4677:295.) These problems got 
much worse. 
The Hesses contacted GTS Construction, their contractor. (R. at 4677:297.) Mr. 
Tracy Smith, the owner of GTS Construction, came to the Hesses' home with some of his 
employees and subcontractors but could not solve the problem. (R. at 4677:303-04.) (A 
photograph of one of the home's exterior doors is attached as Addendum E, which was 
admitted at trial as Exhibit 36L, r. at 3639.) 
The Hesses contacted Atlas Piers, which recommended that one hundred piers be 
installed under the Hesses' home. (R. at 4677:315.) Atlas installed sixteen piers in the 
most troublesome spots at a cost of $24,483.00. (R. at 4677:315-16; 3640.)8 Later, in the 
summer of 2008, the Hesses contracted with Atlas Piers to install the rest of the piers 
Atlas had recommended at a cost of $158,472.50. (R. at 4677:327-29.) In the process, 
Atlas had to jacldiammer the Hesses' concrete basement slab for an additional 
$28,305.00. (R. at 4677:329-30.) 
Since 2005, the Hesses and their family have intensely felt the ripple effects of 
Canberra and Allen failing to disclose the AGEC Report. And the effects are not limited 
to the home itself. Their failure to disclose the report has had long-lasting effects on the 
Hesses, their relationship, their family, and their finances. Because Canberra and Allen 
8
 Atlas Piers' invoice for $24,483.00 was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 20. 
(R. at 3640.) 
9 
did not disclose the AGEC Report, the Hesses could not heed its precautions and 
warnings. And as a result, the Hesses have endured excruciating stress, emotional and 
psychological trauma, and a strain on their marriage and their family, not to mention their 
finances. 
In addition, the repair work has taken a toll on the Hesses and their family. 
Indeed, since first moving into their new home, the Hesses have been forced to dedicate 
their lives to remedying the major problems in their home. This has caused the Hesses 
great stress and mental anguish. A non-exhaustive table of what the Hesses have 
endured, sorted by category, is below. 
tolSCQMFQRT ^ ^ 
I [I]f s been a nightmare to heat. . . . And . . . the bugs, at first it was just insects 
but this last . . . spring we had mice everywhere. And . . . we couldn't fill up all 
the holes, we couldn't keep them out." (R. at 4678:561.) 
"It was deafening. It was extremely annoying. We had to take all the pictures off the 
walls [while they were installing the original piers]." (R. at 4677:325.) (See Addendum 
F, admitted at trial as Exhibit 36KK, r. at 3639.) 
I "[There was] [d]irt, dust, and jack hammering for three weeks straight while we were 
living in the house." (R. at 4677:303.) (Add.F.) 
"This is the same section only back a few feet [where two outside walls have separated]. 
This was six, maybe seven inches wide at the top." (R. at 4677:301.) (A photograph is 
attached as Addendum G, admitted at trial as Exhibit 36DD, r. at 3639.) 
I "That's the other side [of a beam that has separated from the deck]. You're seeing the 
bird's nest. . . . [W]e've [also] had mice in the house." (R. at 4677:301.) (A photograph 
is attached as Addendum H, admitted at trial as Exhibit 36K, r. at 3639.) 
"These cracks are very large. In fact, in the basement, you can feel cool air coming 
through that so it goes all the way through [from the outside of the house to the inside]." 
(R. at 4677:299.) 
FINANCIAL EFFECTS 
r A n d it got to the point where . . . I sold my wedding ring. And so financially it's been 
really hard." (R. at 4678:560.) 
I "[Dealing with the problems with my house] has affected us financially . . . in a big way. 
in 
We have spent a lot of money in attorney[s*] fees. . . . We've spent a lot of money in 
having tests done through Terracon and all these things trying to find out what's going on 
with our home." (R. at 4678:560.) 
uYeabu I put it all [the initial repairs and piers] on my credit cards/' (R. at 4677:316.) 
I "We've . . . had garage sales, . . . sold my kids' air hock[e]y table, their pingpong table, 
their video equipment, just stuff, we got to that point and just to try to keep going to, to 
find out where to get help, how to, how to fix our home and just to keep this going." (R. 
at 4678:560.) 
FAMILY EFFECTS 
''[Dealing with the problems with my house] have affected every area of our life, . . . I 
mean every single area. We had never built a home, we started, we were excited, we 
built it, we were bringing these families together and wanted a place for them and we 
thought we had that, and then within just a couple months,. . . it turned into a nightmare/' 
(R. at4678;559-60.) 
''Mark has a son in Seattle that's wanted to come live with us and . . . that hasn't been 
able to happen. I've needed space for my kids and that hasn't been able to happen." (R. 
at 4678:560-61.) 
"[Tjhen I get a message from Lind[o]n City that they might evict me because of safety 
issues. They were talking about red tagging my home so now Fm worried about, okay, 
now what do we do to fix this?'' (R. at 4677:334.) (A photograph is attached as 
Addendum I, admitted at trial as Exhibit 36BB, r. at 3639.) 
HEALTH EFFECTS 
I "[I]t's hard because my husband [Mark] drinks Pepto Bismol all the time, his stomach 
hurts. It's just affected us every way." (R. at 4678:561.) 
["My wife has pamic attacks now. She ne\ er had those before." (R. at 4677:335.) 
MARRIAGEEFFECTS __^__JL_^ ^ J 
r^TJt's been hard on our marriage, . . . it"s everything we talk about, it's we see it every, 
every time we wake up it's what we see. . . . And it's just, it's just frustrating, you 
know." (R. at 4678:561.) 
u[T]here
 w a s a io t of stress . . . ." (R. at 4677:335.) 
UI can't remember the last time my wife and I had a full night decent sleep where I 
haven't woke[n] up three or four times." (R. at 4677:335.) 
I u[This has impacted my relationship with my wife,] yeah." . . . I haven't really had 
anything else to talk about for four years." (R. at 4677:335 ) 
FEAR AND PANIC 
I *c[We heard noises in the house] after we got back from . . . vacation [m the sprmg of 
2005]. . . . I remember one time laying in bed in the middle of the night and there was a 
crack so loud t h a t . . . I thought our house got hit by lightning, and it just scared both of 
us to death. We realized what it was. And Mark just ran outside on the porch and yelled 
1 to stop raining." (R. at 4678:550-51.) 
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"A lot of emotions. I don't know if I can describe what it feels like to plan and prepare 
for something for as much as 20 years and then to be awoke[n] in the middle of the night 
to terrible sounds of breaking and cracking and wondering if I'm experiencing an 
earthquake. . . . It was scary. It's the middle of the night and I'm panicky. (R. at 
4677:334.) 
u[A]s time went on it just got worse and worse. So we panicked every time it rained." 
(R. at 4678:560.) 
"[0]ne time I was in my bedroom and the window below my bedroom just shattered and 
it was, it's pretty scary. . . . [I]t just scared me to death . . . ." (R. at 4678:551.) 
The Hesses' horror story continues today. These experiences speak for 
themselves, and they exemplify the very definition of mental and emotional distress. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case is about the duties that sellers of real property, and developers of real 
property, owe to their buyers. First, the Hesses argue that Canberra and Allen failed to 
marshal the evidence, as required under this Court's precedent. 
Next, turning to the merits, Canberra and Allen are liable for fraudulent 
nondisclosure because, as a seller and developer of real property, they had a legal duty to 
communicate information—i.e., to disclose the AGEC Report—to the Hesses. Further, 
Canberra and Allen read and knew about the AGEC Report, and it was material to the 
transaction. They failed to disclose it to the Hesses, making them liable. 
The trial court properly concluded that the Hesses did not need to provide expert 
testimony to prove their fraud claims. This Court has already clearly established the duty 
of care that a seller of property and a developer of property owe to a buyer. Therefore, an 
expert was not necessary to establish those duties as might be the case in a medical 
malpractice negligence case. 
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Next, the trial court properly denied Canberra and Allen's motion to dismiss Ms. 
Hess's fraudulent nondisclosure claim. She and Mr. Hess bought the lot, and the 
warranty deed clearly reflects that Canberra and Allen conveyed the lot to Marilyn Hess 
and Mark Hess, and not solely to Mark Hess. 
Canberra and Allen failed to preserve their objection to their proposed jury 
instruction on superseding/intervening cause. In any event, superseding/intervening 
cause applies to negligence causes of action, but not to fraud. 
The trial court also correctly rejected Canberra and Allen's motion for remittitur. 
Canberra and Allen utterly failed to rebut or contest any of the Hesses' testimony and 
evidence on their pain and suffering. Further, the jury's damages award was based on 
sufficient evidence—evidence that Canberra and Allen did not argue against or dispute, 
even in closing argument. 
Finally, the trial court properly affirmed the jury's finding that Canberra and Allen 
are liable to Mr. Hess for fraudulent misrepresentation. Canberra and Allen's actions 
satisfy the elements of that cause of action. 
ARGUMENT 
L CANBERRA AND ALLEN FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires ;%[a] party 
challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding."' In the case of a jury verdict, "an appellant must marshal all of the 
evidence that supports the findings and demonstrate that wrhen viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, there is insufficient evidence to support it."' Steenblik v. 
n 
Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872. 875 (Utah 1995). 
Indeed, the standard for overcoming a jury verdict is high: "[a] 11 reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in favor of the verdict." Id. (citation omitted). If the evidence 
''taken in the light most favorable to the verdict supports the verdict, [the Court] will 
affirm." Steenblikv. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). 
The marshaling requirement is "not intended to gratuitously oppress an appellant; 
rather it exists to facilitate a structured, realistic, and skeptical appraisal of facts without 
unduly compromising the adversarial process." In the Matter ofE.H. v. R.C. and S.C, 
2006 UT 36, lj 64, 137 P.3d 809, 822. At its core, the "duty to marshal evidence 
contemplates that an appellant present every scrap of competent evidence introduced at 
trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists and then ferret out a fatal flaw 
in the evidence, becoming a devil's advocate." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). 
Finally, this Court has "repeatedly . . . warned of the grim consequences parties 
face when they fail to fulfill the marshaling requirement." United Park City Mines Co. v. 
StichtingMayflower Mtn. Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ^  27, 140 P.3d 1200, 1207. When an 
appellant fails to perform this "critical task," the Court "reifies] on that failure to affirm 
the [jury's verdict]." Id.; see also In the Matter ofE.H., 2006 UT 36, % 65; Martinez v. 
Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, ^ 19, 164 P.3d 384, 390 ("[P]arties that fail to 
marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing court will decline, in its 
discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings."). 
In this case, Defendants failed to marshal and they failed to show how the 
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, is insufficient. 
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Canberra and Allen were required to marshal evidence on several issues. Even 
where they partially marshaled on a few issues, they failed to show how the partially 
marshaled evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict.9 For example, 
Canberra and Allen argue that the Court should reduce the jury's award of actual 
damages because they "exceeded the competent evidence by over $215,000 . . . ." 
(Appellants' Br. 47.) Canberra and Allen fail to marshal the evidence (or any evidence) 
on this issue. In fact, they failed to make anything more than a conclusory argument that 
the trial court exceeded the evidence, without stating the jury's actual award, how the 
jury arrived at that award, and why those figures are insufficient. 
In addition, in Canberra and Allen's "statement of facts," they repeatedly failed to 
identify damning testimony and evidence. For example, Canberra and Allen's only 
statement on whether they read the AGEC Report states that Allen "cursorily reviewed 
the AGEC Report . . . . " (Appellants' Br. 6.) In actuality, Allen testified that he "read 
through that [AGEC] report " (R. at 4678: 612.) He also testified that he specifically 
read the "conclusions" section of the report: "[t]he conclusion page was what I was very 
9
 Incomplete marshaling does not satisfy the marshaling requirement. Similarly, if 
an appellant successfully marshals all the evidence, but fails to analyze it and show how-
it is insufficient to support the jury's verdict, the Court will decline to address the issue. 
E.g., United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mtn. Fonds, 2006 UT 35, ^ f 26, 
140 P.3d 1200, 1207 ("[The appellant] ostensibly makes an effort to marshal the evidence 
on pages 21-22 of its brief. . . . But contrary to [the appellant's] wistful assertion, 
presenting evidence supporting the challenged conclusion does not satisfy the marshaling 
requirement. Pairties cannot discharge their duty by simply providing] an exhaustive 
review of all evidence presented at trial."). 
i *; 
interested in. u (R. at 4678: 612.) And that "[w]hat was important to me in [19]97 was 
the conclusions that [AGEC] came to. That's the part that I liked and read and was 
paying attention to." (R. at 4678:522-23.) 
Canberra and Allen omitted a significant amount of incriminating information 
from their brief, instead often painting the facts in a light most favorable to themselves. 
Therefore, the Court should affirm based on their failure to marshal. 
IL THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE JURY'S FINDING THAT CANBERRA 
AND ALLEN ARE LIABLE FOR FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE. 
The law on fraudulent nondisclosure is simple. To prevail on a claim of 
fraudulent nondisclosure, the plaintiff applies a three-part test (in this order) to show: (1) 
the defendant had a duty to communicate information, (2) the defendant knew about the 
information, and (3) the nondisclosed information was material.11 Yazd v. Woodside 
Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47,135, 143 P.3d 283, 289. 
In this case, the jury found both Canberra and Allen liable for fraudulent 
nondisclosure because, as sellers of real property and as developers of real property, 
In their brief, claim "Allen cursorily reviewed the AGEC Report when [he 
received it], focusing on the conclusions of the study . . . ." (Appellants' Br. 6.) Even 
assuming Canberra and Allen read only the "conclusions" section of the report, they 
would have learned that the "[rjeeommendations contained in th[e] report should be 
carefully followed" and that "[m]oisture sensitive soils have been reported," so 
"[precautions with respect to constructing in moisture sensitive soil areas are included in 
th[e] report." (Add. A.) 
11
 The jury was instructed as to these elements injury instruction number 19. (R. 
at 3721.) 
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 Canberra and Allen argue that the jury's verdict against them on fraudulent 
nondisclosure is a "mixed question[] of fact and law," which would require this Court to 
give no "deference to the decision of the district court . . . ." (Appellants' Br. 31.) More 
importantly, Canberra and Allen, mistakenly believing this to be a mixed question of fact 
16 
Canberra and Allen owed a variety of duties to the Hesses, including: (1) a duty to 
disclose to the Hesses material known defects that cannot be discovered by a reasonable 
inspection by an ordinary prudent buyer,13 Mitchell v Christensen, 2001 UT 80. fflf 10-
16, 31 P.3d 572, 574-76; and (2) a duty to disclose to the Hesses "any condition vshich he 
knows or reasonably ought to know makes . . . subdivided lots unsuitable for . . . 
residential building/'14 Yazd, 2006 UT 47, \ 24. 
A, Canberra and Allen's Conduct Satisfy the Elements of Fraudulent 
Nondisclosure. 
The jury correctly found that Canberra and Allen's conduct satisfied the three-part 
test for fraudulent nondisclosure. 
1. Canberra and Allen had a "legal duty to communicate 
information"—to disclose the AGEC Report—to the Hesses. 
Canberra and Allen had a "legal duty to communicate information"' to the Hesses. 
The information that Canberra and Allen had a legal duty to communicate to the Hesses 
and law, fail to marshal the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, then show how that 
evidence is legally insufficient when viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict. 
Canberra and Allen are wrong on all points. Whether Canberra and Allen's 
conduct met the three-prong test for fraudulent nondisclosure was a factual jury question 
and one presented to them both in the stipulated jury instructions on the issue, instruction 
number 19 (r. at 3721). and on the stipulated Verdict Form (r. at 3744-49). 
In rendering its verdict, the jury answered purely factual questions—not mixed 
questions of fact and law—thus requiring Canberra and Allen to marshal all the evidence 
and show how that evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict 
is insufficient. By their own admission, Canberra and Allen failed to marshal because 
they believed this is a "mixed question[] of fact and law [under which] . . . this Court 
does not grant any deference to the decision of the District Court. . . ." (Appellants' Br. 
31.) 
13
 The pcirties stipulated to this statement of a seller's duty as jury instruction 
number 21. (R. at 3719.) 
14
 The parties stipulated to this statement of a developer's duty as jury instruction 
number 20. (R. at 3720.) 
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included the existence of a geotechnical report, known as the %'AGEC Report," for the 
Hesses' subdivision, as well as the fact that there was bad soil in the development. (Add. 
A.) The jury found that Canberra and Allen failed to meet that duty when they did not 
disclose the AGEC Report to the Hesses. 
The source of this duty is twofold: it arises first because Canberra and Allen were 
sellers of real property, and it arises second because Canberra and Allen were developers 
of real property. And the parties stipulated to include both of these sources of Canberra 
and Allen's duty (as a seller and as a developer) as jury instructions numbers 20 and 21. 
(R. at 3719-20.) 
a. Canberra and Allen were sellers of real property, thus owing 
the Hesses a duty to disclose defects, including collapsible 
soils, that could not be discovered by a reasonable inspection. 
First, Canberra and Allen were sellers of real property. (R. at 4678:508; 3641 
(Exhibit 6, attached as Addendum C); 3640 (Exhibit 11, attached as Addendum D).) 
As established in Mitchell and reiterated in Hermansen, as sellers of real property7, 
Canberra and Allen had a duty to disclose the AGEC Report to the Hesses, which they 
failed to do. 
A seller's duty of disclosure could not be clearer. u[S]ellers of real property owe a 
duty to disclose material known defects that cannot be discovered by a reasonable 
inspection by an ordinary prudent buyer/* Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, \ 25, 48 
P.3d235,242. 
Therefore, Canberra and Allen—as sellers of real property—owed a duty as a 
matter of law to disclose to the Hesses material known defects that could not be 
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discovered by a reasonable inspection; they had a duty as a matter of law to disclose the 
AGEC Report.L> Canberra and Allen knew about the potential for soil problems in the 
development. Allen testified that he "read through that report [the AGEC Report] 
(R. at 4678: 612.) He also testified that he read the "conclusions" section of the report:16 
"[t]he conclusion page was what I was very interested in." (R. at 4678: 612.) Therefore, 
he knew about the AGEC Report, he knew about its precautions, and he knew that it was 
supposed to be "carefully followed." (Add. A.) 
It is undisputed that Canberra and Allen, the sellers, already had a geotechnical 
report on the property at the time the Hesses bought their lot. (R. at 4677:188; 4678:521; 
Add. A.) Canberra and Allen were in the best position to prevent future damage to the 
buyers' homes by disclosing the AGEC Report to the Hesses. Then the Hesses could 
have passed the AGEC Report along to their contractor, who could have "carefully 
followed" the recommendations in the report. Unfortunately, Canberra and Allen did not 
alert the Hesses to the toxic lot they purchased, and their dream of building a new home 
quickly became a nightmare. 
b. Canberra and Allen were developers of real property, thus 
owing the Hesses a duty to disclose any condition they 
"know[] or reasonably ought to know" makes the lot 
unsuitable for construction. 
Notably, the Utah Supreme Court did not throw out the Mitchell case for the 
plaintiffs failure to present expert testimony on whether the home seller complied with 
his duty to disclose material known defects that cannot be discovered by a reasonable 
inspection by an ordinary prudent buyer. Yet that is what Canberra and Allen argue the 
Court should do in this case, which the Hesses discuss at Section III infra. 
16
 The jury was free to believe that Mr. Allen gave the AGEC Report a more in-
depth analysis than he testified to. See footnote 19 infra. 
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Canberra and Allen were developers of real property. (R. at 4678:508; 3641 
(Exhibit 6, Add. B); 3640 (Exhibit 11, Add. D).) And as established in Loveland v. 
Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), Smith v. Frandsem 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 
919, and Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283, as developers of 
real property, Canberra and Allen had a duty to disclose the AGEC Report to the Hesses, 
which they failed to do. 
This Court first promulgated a developer's duties in Loveland, and the Court 
discussed those duties in both Smith and Yazd. Specifically, the court held that: 
where land is subdivided and sold for the purpose of constructing 
residential dwelling houses, the developer has a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some 
type of ordinary, average dwelling house[17] and he [the developer] must 
At trial and throughout their brief, Canberra and Allen have been laser-focused 
on this principle: a "developer has a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the 
subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling 
house . . . ." For example, at trial, counsel for Canberra and Allen repeatedly asked Mr. 
Allen variations on the question of whether there was "anything . . . in [the AGEC 
Report] that says . . . you can't build an ordinary average dwelling home in the vicinity of 
. . . [the Hesses' lot]?" (R. at 4678: 617, 617.) Counsel for Canberra and Allen made the 
same query several times of Mr. James Nordquist, the Hesses' geotechnical expert who 
possesses a masters degree in civil engineering from Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology: "Is there anything in the conclusion section of the recommendation sections 
[of the AGEC Report] that would have raised a red flag . . . that an ordinary foothill home 
could not be built on [the Hesses' lot]?" (R. at 4677:172, 204.) And in their brief, 
Canberra and Allen repetitively argued that the lone standard is whether "an 'ordinary, 
average' home could not be constructed on [the Hesses' lot]." (Appellants' Br. 34.) 
At trial and in their brief, Canberra and Allen missed the point. They willfully 
ignore the rest of the Court's damning holding which explains precisely how a developer 
complies with his duty of ensuring that a lot is suitable for the construction of a home: by 
"disclosing] to his purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to 
know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building" Canberra and 
Allen turn a blind eye to this requirement because it is the nail in their coffin, as they 
failed to disclose the AGEC Report to the Hesses. 
Canberra and Allen argued that there is nothing in the AGEC Report that says an 
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disclose to his purchaser any condition which he [1] knows or [2] 
reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such 
residential building, 
Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769 (emphases added) (citation and quotations omitted). 
Adding onto that statement this Court clarified that the duty did not "extend to 
deficiencies in residential building lots that are easily discernible during an ordinary and 
reasonable investigation by a purchaser and that are in fact known of by the purchaser." 
Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769. But this exception "does not follow with regard to latent 
defects, those which a buyer cannot reasonable be expected to discover." Id. 
Thus, taking the statements of duty together, and as Canberra and Allen repeatedly 
concede, they—as the developers—had a duty to ensure that the Hesses' lot was suitable 
for the construction of an ordinary, average home. But Canberra and Allen are blind to 
the rest of this Court's holding: that Canberra and Allen "disclose to his purchaser any 
condition which he [1] knows or [2] reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided 
ordinary, average home cannot be built on the Hesses5 lot. But a geotechnical report 
would scarcely contain such a sweeping statement and conclude that an entire subdivision 
cannot be developed due to soil conditions. In fact, the purpose of a geotechnical 
evaluation is to provide recommendations that the developer can follow that will then 
render a lot (or a subdivision) buildable without consequences like those suffered by the 
Hesses. Indeed, that is precisely what the AGEC Report would have done in this case by 
providing the Hesses recommendations to be "carefully followed." 
The AGEC Report did not permanently preclude construction of homes in the 
Canberra subdivision, nor did it have to in order for Canberra and Allen to disclose the 
AGEC Report to the Hesses. The Hesses' lot was not forever unbuildable. Rather, the 
AGEC Report identified soil problems, provided warnings, and made recommendations 
that Canberra and Allen should have disclosed to ensure that the lots were suitable for the 
construction of ordinary, average homes. And until Canberra and Allen disclosed the 
AGEC Report, the problems with the soil, and the specific recommendations to be 
"carefully followed," the lot was unsuitable for the construction of an ordinary, average 
home. 
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lots unsuitable for such residential building." 
Stated differently, the developer must disclose any condition which he knows 
makes a lot unsuitable for a home. But he also must disclose any condition which he 
reasonably ought to know makes a lot unsuitable for a home. 
In this case, Canberra and Allen breached both requirements. As to the first duty, 
Allen testified that he "read through that report [the AGEC Report] " (R. at 4678: 
612.) He also testified that he read the "conclusions" section of the report: "[t]he 
conclusion page was what I was very interested in." (R. at 4678: 612.) By reading the 
"conclusions" section (the second page) of the AGEC Report, Canberra and Allen would 
have read all the warnings and recommendations. (These are detailed in Add. A and in 
the "statement of facts," supra.) Thus, Canberra and Allen "kn[ew] [of conditions that] 
. . . ma[de] the subdivided lots unsuitable for . . . residential building." Yet Canberra and 
Allen did not disclose the AGEC Report to the Hesses, which would have allowed the 
Hesses to mitigate against the collapsible soil on their lot. Instead, the Hesses' home 
sunk nearly five inches, which is approximately ten times the normal amount of settling 
for a new home. (R. at 4677:180-81.) 
The second duty—that Canberra and Allen "ought to know [of conditions that] . . . 
make[] the subdivided lots unsuitable for . . . residential building"—was also breached. 
Canberra and Allen reasonably ought to have known that the Hesses' lot was unsuitable 
for a home without "carefully following]" the precautions in the AGEC Report because 
Canberra and Allen possessed (and read) the AGEC Report. And the AGEC Report not 
only detailed soil problems throughout the development, but also revealed that test pit 
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12—which was on the Hesses' lot—contained soils with "moisture sensitivity or 
collapse potential" about nine feet below the surface (r. at 4677:188), which is 
approximately where excavation for the Hesses' basement would end (r. at 4677:289). 
Whether Canberra and/or Allen read any of the AGEC Report is irrelevant; they 
would still be liable for failing to disclose the mere existence Report. In Yazd, the 
defendant, Woodside Homes, not only failed to read the geotechnical report known as the 
"Delta Report"), but Woodside did not even possess the Delta Report. Yazd, 2006 UT 
47, Tf 5. Rather, Woodside knew about the Delta Report only because of a short written 
reference to it on a real estate purchase contract. Moreover, the Delta Report pertained 
to an adjacent development that did not include the plaintiff's property^ whereas in this 
case, the AGEC Report not only pertained to Canberra development, but it included the 
Hesses5 lot. (Add. A, fig. 2.) In fact, test pit 12 in the AGEC Report was located on the 
Hesses5 lot. (Add. A, fig. 2.) Even with the liable party far removed from the dispositive 
geotechnical report in Yazd, in that case, the Court held that the builder-developer was 
chargeable with the contents of the geotechnical report. 
The thrust of Yazd is that all material information must flow to the buyer, even 
when a developer obtains its own geotechnical report. Canberra and Allen failed to 
disclose the mere existence of AGEC Report to the Hesses, and therefore, they breached 
their duties of disclosure. 
Canberra and Allen would have this Court adopt a rule that insulates a developer 
from liability if the developer merely obtains a geotechnical report; the developer need 
not read it, follow it, or disclose it to buyers to satisfy the developer's duty. Putting aside 
the fact that this new "rule*' would contradict this Court's precedents from Loveland, 
Smith, and Yazd* this new "rule" would lead to absurd consequences. Developers would 
obtain geotechnical reports to satisfy their duty, but the duty would be toothless and 
meaningless if the developers do not have to pass that information along to the 
homebuyers.18 Canberra and Allen's willful blindness and interpretation of a developer's 
duty is contrary to precedent and to common sense. 
2. Canberra and Allen, the "part[ies] failing to disclose," knew 
about the AGEC Report. 
Next, the Hesses must satisfy the second element for fraudulent nondisclosure: 
that Canberra and Allen, the "part[ies] failing to disclose/' knew about the AGEC Report. 
The jury unanimously concluded that Canberra and Allen knew7 about the AGEC Report. 
(R. at 4678:777). Moreover, Canberra and Allen do not contest this issue: "[i]n 1997, 
Canberra obtained [a geotechnical soils analysis] for Canberra Heights Phase 1 
subdivision [the Hesses' subdivision], from [AGEC] . . . . " (Appellants' Br. 5.) 
Canberra and Allen not only received the AGEC Report, but they also read it and 
knew about the potential for soil problems in the development. Allen testified that he 
"read through that [AGEC] report " (R. at 4678: 612.) He also testified that he read 
In the criminal context, courts sometimes give juries a "willful blindness" 
instruction if a "defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have 
been obvious to him." United States v Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 652 (3d Cir. 2006). Such 
an instruction informs jurors 'that they may impose criminal liability on people who, 
recognizing the likelihood of wrongdoing, nonetheless consciously refuse to take 
investigatory steps." United States v Azubike, 564 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2009). 
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the "conclusions" section of the report: "[t]he conclusion page was what I was very 
interested in."20 (R. at 4678: 612.) 
Canberra and Allen cannot dispute that they knew about the AGEC Report—and 
even more, that they had read the "conclusions" section and the rest of the report as well. 
Therefore, the Court should affirm the jury's finding. 
3. The "nondisclosed information"—the AGEC Report—was 
material. 
Finally, the jury concluded that the "nondisclosed information," the AGEC 
Report, was material. Canberra and Allen do not contest this issue. 
This Court in Yazd spoke to the "materiality" element. It left to "the trier of fact to 
determine . . . whether [the] contends] [of a geotechnical report] was sufficiently 
important such that its disclosure would have influenced the decisions made by the 
The jury was free to believe that Mr. Allen gave the AGEC Report a more in-
depth analysis than he testified to. Jury instruction number 13, titled "Believability of 
Witnesses," established that the jury was free to "evaluate the believability of [witnesses' 
testimony]," that they could "believe all or any part of the testimony of a witness," and 
that they could consider personal interest, bias, demeanor, consistency, reasonableness, 
and other factors in weighing a witness's testimony. (R. at 3727.) Based on this 
instruction, the jury could have believed that Mr. Allen read the AGEC Report in greater 
detail than he testified to. 
The jury's conclusion is buffered by the fact that Defendant Allen testified that he 
had ordered and received "[s]even or eight" other geotechnical soil reports, similar to the 
AGEC Report, for other portions of the Canberra subdivision before he received and read 
the AGEC Report. (R. at 4678: 610.) 
20
 In their brief, claim "Allen cursorily reviewed the AGEC Report when [he 
received it], focusing on the conclusions of the study . . . ." (Appellants' Br. 6.) Even 
assuming Canberra and Allen read only the "conclusions" section of the report, they 
would have learned that the "[recommendations contained in th[e] report should be 
carefully followed" and that "[mjoisture sensitive soils have been reported," so 
"[precautions with respect to constructing in moisture sensitive soil areas are included in 
th[e] report." (Add. A.) 
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buyers with respect to the property." Id. 
In clarifying the definition of "materiality/5 the Court held that u[t]o be material, 
the information must be 'important.5 Importance, in turn, can be gauged by the degree to 
which the information could be expected to influence the judgment of a person buying 
property or assenting to a particular purchase price/* Id. \ 34. In Yazd, the Court 
concluded "that a finder of fact could reasonably find that the contents of the 
[geotechnical] report meet this definition of materiality/' Id. 
In this case, the parties stipulated to the instruction on "materiality/5 which was 
this Court's pronouncement from Yazd as Jury Instruction Number 22. (R. at 3718.) And 
the jury unanimously concluded that the AGEC Report was material. (R. at 4678:777.) 
B. The Court of Appeals Misunderstood and Misapplied Smith in Anderson v. 
Kriser. A Developer Always Owes a Duty of Disclosure to a Purchaser in 
Privity. 
Canberra and Allen urge this Court to abandon this Court's precedents in 
Loveland, Smith, and Yazd and adopt the Utah Court of Appeals* (incorrect) 
understanding of a developer's duty from an unpublished memorandum decision, 
91 
Anderson v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319, on which this Court recently granted certiorari. 
There are procedural and substantive problems with this argument. First and most 
importantly, in Anderson, the court of appeals erred and misunderstood Smith and its 
holding, mistakenly believing that a developer who sells a lot directly to a homebuyer 
91 
On February 25, 2010, this Court granted the Andersons* Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari in Anderson v. Kriser. For a more thorough discussion of the court of appeals5 
error in Anderson and why that case is not controlling here, the Hesses urge this Court to 
review the petition, opposition to the petition, and reply in support of the petition in 
Anderson v Kriser, case number 20091032. 
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owes no duties to that homebuyer if the homebuyer hires a separate contractor to build 
the home. This holding stems from a misunderstanding and misapplication of Smith v. 
Frandsen to the Anderson case, and the court of appeals' holding is contrary to Loveland, 
Smith, and Yazd. A developer in privity with a homebuyer always owes a duty of 
disclosure to "its immediate transferees/' regardless of whether that developer or a 
separate contractor builds the home. Smith, 2004 UT 55, f^ 28. Second, Anderson v. 
Kriser is an unpublished memorandum decision from the court of appeals, and it holds no 
precedential value for this Court. And third, the Anderson case is currently under 
certiorari review by this Court. 
IIL THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE HESSES 
NEED NOT PROVIDE EXPERT TESTIMONY TO PROVE THEIR 
CLAIMS AGAINST CANBERRA AND ALLEN. 
Canberra and Allen erroneously argue that the Hesses were required to present 
expert testimony on whether Canberra and Allen breached their duty to disclose the 
AGEC Report. And they argue that, as a result, 
[t]he jury was . . . allowed to treat this as a res ipsa loquitur/negligence case 
when the jury was incorrectly allowed to determine the standard of care, 
instead of being given proper expert testimony to guide the jury in what a 
developer or owner of a development company should have done. 
(Appellants' Br. 39.) 
This is not a negligence case, and fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent 
Even if the Court were to treat this as a negligence case, Utah law "does not 
require expert testimony to establish the standard of care in eveiy negligence case.'5 Ortiz 
v. Geneva Rock Prods., 939 P.2d 1213, 1217 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (emphasis added). 
Expert testimony is "especially considered unnecessary . . . in cases involving trades or 
professions that do not require a high degree of specialized knowledge, as opposed to 
0 7 
misrepresentation are not negligence-based causes of action, nor are they strict liability— 
they are intentional torts. J In a negligence case, the plaintiff must first establish the duty 
of care owed by the defendant, then show that the defendant breached that duty. In 
contrast, in a fraud case, the issue is whether the defendant committed the intentional tort 
trades or professional that do, such as medicine, architecture, and engineering."' Id. 
(emphasis added); see also Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570, 574 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that expert testimony "is needed where the average person has 
little understanding of the duties owed by particular trades or professions, as in cases 
involving medical doctors, architects, and engineers. . . . [But] [w]here the propriety of 
the defendant's action is within the common knowledge and experience of the layman . .. 
the guidance provided by expert testimony is unnecessary5'). 
In this case, the Court has already established the duty owed by sellers and 
developers to buyers. The duty is clearly laid out in Loveland, Smith, Mitchell, and Yazd. 
It is one of disclosure. And whether Canberra and Allen disclosed the AGEC Report to 
the Hesses is a simple factual matter with the province and experience of the layperson. 
2j
 In their brief, Canberra and Allen assert that "[sjtrict liability is all the Hesses 
proved . . . . " (Appellants5 Br. 30.) 
Canberra and Allen misunderstand and conflate the concepts of negligence and 
strict liability. Strict liability is liability without fault. In strict liability, the law imposes 
a duty on certain actors to avoid injury to the plaintiff entirely—or pay for any resulting 
injuries. Where such a duty exists (for example, with ultra-hazardous activities), the 
defendant is liable regardless of the care that he or she took, or the care with which he or 
she conducted the activity. The liability flows not from carelessness, but from the very 
choice to conduct the activity at all. And no matter how much care he or she takes to 
avoid injury to others, he or she will be held "strictly liable" if such injuries result. See, 
e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 519(1) ("One who carries on an abnormally 
dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another 
resulting from the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the 
harm.'5). 
Neither fraudulent nondisclosure nor fraudulent misrepresentation is a strict 
liability cause of action because it is not the case that a seller or developer is strictly 
liable for the condition of the soil, regardless of the care the seller or developer exercised. 
Rather, a seller or developer is liable only to the extent he or she fails to satisfy the 
duty to "disclose to his purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to 
know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building.55 Yazd, 2006 UT 
47, f 24. Once the seller or developer satisfies that duty to disclose, his or her liability 
ceases. If fraudulent nondisclosure and fraudulent misrepresentation were strict liability 
torts, Canberra and Allen would be liable for the damage to the Hesses5 home regardless 
of whether Canberra and Allen disclosed the AGEC Report. 
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of fraud and whether the defendant satisfied the elements of each fraud cause of action. 
As to the fraud claims in this case, the Hesses did not have to call an expert to 
speculate or opine about the duties that Canberra and Allen owed the Hesses because the 
a seller's and developer's duty of disclosure have been clearly established (and repeated) 
by this Court in Loveland, Smith, Mitchell, and Yazd. Simply, Canberra and Allen, as 
sellers and developers, had a duty to disclose the AGEC Report to the Hesses. Whether 
Canberra and Allen breached that duty—i.e., whether they disclosed the AGEC Report— 
did not require expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the Hesses did not need to provide 
expert testimony on whether Canberra and Allen breached their duty to disclose the 
AGEC Report to the Hesses. 
Moreover, Canberra and Allen cite no case—Utah or otherwise—for the novel 
proposition that the Hesses were required to present expert testimony that Canberra and 
Allen failed to follow their duties under Loveland, Smith, Mitchell, and Yazd. A close 
examination of Utah case law concerning expert testimony—and a recognition that no 
case in the country requires expert testimony in a case like this, as suggested by Canberra 
and Allen—show their argument to be flawed. 
For example, in a traditional negligence case, like a medical malpractice action, 
the plaintiff must call an expert to testify what standard of care the defendant-doctor 
owed the patient and that the defendant-doctor breached that standard. Nixdorfv. Hicken, 
612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1980). An expert is required because it is not possible (or wise) 
for the courts or legislatures to establish the standard of care in every conceivable 
scenario. An expert is required because "the nature of the profession removes the 
particularities of its practice from the knowledge and understanding of the average 
citizen." Id. 
In malpractice actions generally the physician is held to the standard of skill 
employed by his contemporaries in the same or similar communities. 
Therefore, before the plaintiff can prevail in a medical malpractice action, 
he must establish both the standard of care required of the defendant as a 
practicing physician in the community and the defendant's failure to employ 
that standard. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
In this case, the Hesses did not have to call an expert to establish the standard of 
care required of Canberra and Allen because Loveland, Mitchell, Smith, Hermansen, and 
Yazd already established that standard. Those cases establish many duties that Canberra 
and Allen—as sellers and developers of real property—owed the Hesses as a matter of 
law. 
In addition, even if the Utah appellate courts had not already established the 
standards applicable to sellers and developers of real property, the Utah courts have 
recognized an exception to the general rule that "expert testimony is required [when] the 
nature of the profession removes the particularities of its practice from the knowledge 
and understanding of the average citizen." Nixdorf 612 P.2d at 352. 
Specifically, "expert testimony is unnecessary to establish the standard of care 
owed the plaintiff where the propriety of the treatment received is within the common 
knowledge and experience of the layman." Id. In the medical malpractice context, "the 
loss of a surgical instrument or other paraphernalia, in the operating site, exemplifies this 
10 
type of treatment.55 Id. 
Similarly, the Hesses did not have to establish the standard of care in this case 
because the "propriety45 of Canberra and Allen's actions—obtaining a geotechnical 
report, reading it, knowing it contained warnings about the soils in the development, and 
not disclosing its existence or contents to the Hesses—is within the common knowledge 
and experience of the layman. Just like a layman can conclude, without expert testimony, 
that a doctor breached his standard of care by leaving a surgical needle inside a patient, a 
layman can also conclude, without expert testimony, that a developer who commissions a 
geotechnical report that warns to mitigate against soil problems, who reads the report, 
and who does not share the existence or contents of the report with a buyer has breached 
his standard of care. Therefore, the Hesses did not have to present expert testimony to 
establish the standard of care applicable to sellers and developers of real property7 because 
whether Canberra and Allen should have disclosed the existence and contents of the 
AGEC Report to Plaintiffs is within the province of a layperson jury.24 
Further, 1he Hesses did not have to call an expert to testify that Canberra and Allen 
In another case, the issue was "whether the [defendant's] duty of reasonable 
care required it to install a fire sprinkler system [in a high-rise apartment building].55 
Schreiter, 871 P.2d at 575. The plaintiff failed to present expert testimony to establish 
the applicable standard of care or whether the defendant breached the duty. Id. 
Even so, the Utah Court of Appeals held that the absence of expert testimony was 
not fatal to the plaintiffs case because "a jury could reasonably find that [the defendant] 
was negligent even absent [expert] testimony [on the issue of the defendant's duty of care 
regarding installing a fire sprinkler system.]55 Id. The court reasoned that "[t]his is 
simply not a situation where the issues or facts appear to be so complex or technical that 
they would otherwise elude the mental processes of the average citizen."5 Id. 
And in Schreiter, just as in our case, the defendant did not "cite to any authority 
requiring expert testimony to make out a prima facie case in similar cases.55 Id. (footnote 
omitted). 
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failed to meet the standards in this case because a developer is not a profession that 
"require[s] a high degree of specialized knowledge, as opposed to trades or professions 
that do, such as medicine, architecture, and engineering/' Ortiz, 939 P.2d at 1217 n.2. 
Unlike professions like medicine, architecture, and engineering, a "developer*' does not 
require any special training, education, certification, degrees, or experience. Indeed, an 
individual "becomes a developer*' by self-designation. It is not something an individual 
earns or achieves. A developer could be anyone from a high school student to an elderly 
grandmother looking to flip property and make a quick profit. 
Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the Hesses did not have to 
present expert testimony concerning whether Canberra and Allen disclosed the AGEC 
Report to the Hesses. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED CANBERRA AND ALLEN'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS MS. HESS'S FRAUDULENT NONDISCLOSURE 
CLAIM. 
Canberra and Allen argue that Ms. Hess's fraudulent nondisclosure claim should 
have been dismissed because Canberra and Allen did not commit that tort against Ms. 
Hess. This argument falls flat. 
Canberra and Allen concede that they conveyed the lot not only to Mark Hess, but 
also to Marilyn Hess. (Appellants5 Br. 42.) The warranty deed—signed by Mr. Allen— 
25
 For example, expert testimony is typically required in cases involving 
professions involving a high degree of technical knowledge and expertise, such as for 
medical doctors, Chadwickv. Nielsel, 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), architects, 
Nauman v. HaroldK. Beecher &Assocs , 467 P.2d 610, 615 (Utah 1970), and engineers, 
Nat'I Housing Indust, Inc. v. E. L. Jones Dev. Co . 576 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1978). 
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reveals as much, showing that Canberra conveyed lot 41 to "Mark Hess and Marilyn 
Hess." (Add.D.) 
Moreover, Ms. Hess testified that she and Mark both got the loan to purchase lot 
41. (R. at 4678 549.) She and Mark paid Canberra $150,000 in consideration for title to 
lot 41. As the party paying Canberra and Allen for the lot, Canberra and Allen cannot 
disclaim its duties to its buyers, which were both Mark Hess and Marilyn Hess. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED CANBERRA AND ALLEN'S 
MOTION FOR JNOV. 
Canberra and Allen argue that the trial court should have granted their motion for 
JNOV.27 
Canberra and Allen's global JNOV argument encompasses each of their other 
appellate issues. So, consistent with the Hesses5 brief, they contend that jury's verdict 
and damages award are based on sufficient and competent evidence, and the Hesses 
incorporate their individual arguments in response to Canberra and Allen's general 
Even Steven Tanner, Canberra's vice president and broker, testified that "they 
provided us with a check for . . . $1,000 in earnest money and then I presented it to Mr. 
Allen for his acceptance." (R. at 4675:83.) (Emphasis added.) 
And repeatedly, upon being questioned about the Hesses5 fraudulent nondisclosure 
claims and whether he disclosed the AGEC Report to the Hesses, Mr. Tanner referred to 
the Hesses in the plural form, for example, "I didn't tell them anything/' and "I told them 
everything I knew which was on the recorded plat. . . ." (R. at 4675:83.) (Emphases 
added.) These and other such references drew no objection or clarification on cross 
examination from Canberra and Allen. 
" This Court will reverse a trial court's denial of a JNOV "only if, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the [Hesses]," the Court "concludes that the 
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict." Hall v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 959 P.2d 
109, 111 (Utah 1998). And "in order to prevail, the appealing party must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." Id. 
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allegation that the trial court erred by denying their motion for JNOV. 
VL CANBERRA AND ALLEN DID NOT PRESERVE THEIR OBJECTION TO 
THEIR PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION ON SUPERSEDING/ 
INTERVENING CAUSE, WHICH, REGARDLESS, APPLIES TO 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS—NOT TO FRAUD CLAIMS. 
In Section IV of their brief, Canberra and Allen argue that the contractor, GTS 
Construction, cut off Canberra and Allen's liability because GTS Construction, not 
Canberra or Allen, built the home. (Appellants' Br. 43-45.) In support of this argument, 
Canberra and Allen provide a block quote and pinpoint cite from the Smith case that is 
not found in Smith or any other Utah case. (Appellants' Br. 44.) In addition, they argue 
that the Court should have given their proposed jury instruction number 17, which would 
have instructed the jury that Canberra and Allen were not liable to the Hesses because of 
the conduct of the builder. 
Canberra and Allen failed to object to the trial court's refusal to give this 
instruction, therefore, they waived the alleged error and cannot raise it for the first time 
on appeal. Further, Canberra and Allen's proposed instruction 17 is a negligence-based 
instruction, which they concede comes from the "negligence" section of the Model Utah 
Jury Instructions, Second Edition ("MUJI 2d"). And last, as a matter of public policy, 
fraud cannot be superseded. Therefore, the Court should not entertain Canberra and 
Allen's arguments on this issue. 
A. Canberra and Allen's Fabricated New Law, Supposedly from Smith, does 
not Exist. 
On page 44 of their brief, Canberra and Allen provide the Court with a block quote 
Id 
that purportedly comes from Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919. The block 
quote has two paragraphs. The first paragraph is a (somewhat) accurate quote from 
Smith. 
The second paragraph, however, is a cut-from-whole-cloth fabrication of the law. 
Surely, it is a statement of what Canberra and Allen would like the law to be. The 
manufactured paragraph states that: "A developer can rely upon the eventual builder of 
the home complying with the builder's duty of care, including reasonable familiarity with 
subsurface conditions." (Appellants' Br. 44.) 
This "quote" is part of the block quote from Smith in Canberra and Allen's brief. 
They also underlined it for emphasis and went on to state "emphasis added," indicating 
that the underlining did not appear in the case. 
In reality
 ? the sentence itself dots not appear in the case. In fact, it does not appear 
in any Utah case. Equally important, it is not an accurate statement of the law in Utah; a 
developer is not relieved of its duty of disclosure under Mitchell and Lovelandl 
Smith/Yazd. Essentially, it is argument masquerading as law, complete with a faux 
pinpoint citation to Smith, stating it appeared on page 924 of that case. The Court should 
disregard the feigned quote from Smith. 
R Canberra and Allen Failed to Object to the Trial Court's Refusal to Give 
Their Proposed Instruction on Intervening/Superseding Cause. 
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 It is only somewhat accurate because Canberra and Allen altered the first 
paragraph of the block quote in their brief by using the word "buyer" instead of the 
phrase "vendee, or his successor," without putting the word "buyer" in brackets and 
without using ellipses to indicate an omission from the quote. Smith, 2004 UT 55, f^ 17, 
94P.3d919,924. 
Rule 51(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party to object, with 
specificity, to preserve the alleged error for appeal: 
[u]nless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, 
the instruction may not be assigned as error . . . . In objecting to the giving 
of an instruction, a party shall identify the matter to v\hich the objection is 
made and the grounds for the objection. 
Utah appellate law confirms this rule. "'No part}7 may assign as error the giving or 
failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto/' R T Nielson Co v Cook, 2002 
UT 11, \ 10. 40 P.3d 1119,1123. Moreover, to "appeal the . . . refusal of a jury 
instruction, a party must properly object to the instructions in the trial court and explain 
its grounds, with specificity, for challenging the instructions." Id 
If a party claiming error "does not object and articulate the grounds with sufficient 
specificity such that the issue is presented before the trial court for consideration, that 
issue cannot be raised on appeal^ Id (emphasis added). 
Here, Canberra and Allen argue that the trial court should have given their 
proposed instruction on superseding/intervening cause, found in the Record at 3648, 
which they also recited verbatim page 45 of their brief. But Canberra and Allen never 
objected to the trial court's refusal to give this instruction. At the end of trial, Canberra 
and Allen objected to two jury instructions, neither of which was an objection on 
superseding/intervening cause. (R. at 4678:771.) Therefore, because they did not object 
in the trial court, they waived their right to claim error on appeal, so the Court should 
29 
Canberra and Allen cite the incorrect page in the record for this proposed jury 
instruction, stating it is found at R. 4680. (Appellants' Br. 45.) This is incorrect. The 
correct citation is R. at 3648. 
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disregard Canberra and Allen's claimed error on this issue. 
C Even Disregarding the Hesses' Foregoing Arguments. Canberra and 
Allen's Proposed Jury Instruction Applies to Negligence, but not Fraud. 
Even if the Court ignored the Hesses' foregoing arguments, Canberra and Allen's 
proposed instruction on superseding/intervening cause applies to negligence-based causes 
of action, but not to causes of action based in the intentional tort of fraud. In fact, their 
proposed instruction, 210, comes from the "negligence" section in the new MUJI 2d. 
The trial court correctly precluded this instruction from being given to the jury. 
Moreover, this Court has specifically addressed this issue. In Berkeley Bank for 
Cooperatives v. Meibos, the Court concluded that negligence-based defenses, like 
superseding cause, were applicable to negligence-based causes of action, like negligent 
misrepresentation. 607 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1980). But the court also held that 
negligence-based defenses, like superseding cause, are "not a proper defense in the case 
of an intentional misrepresentation." Id. (emphasis added). Quoting Prosser, the court 
restated the universal maxim that "'mere negligence . . . is not a defense to an intentional 
tort.'" Id. (quoting Dean Prosser, Law of Torts, § 108 at 716 (4th ed. 1971)). Therefore, 
Canberra and Allen cannot proffer superseding/intervening cause as a complete defense 
to fraud, an intentional tort. 
D. As a Matter of Public Policy, a Third Party Cannot Supersede a 
Tortfeasor's Fraud. 
Finally, even if superseding/intervening cause were a complete defense to 
intentional torts like fraud, because the alleged superseding acts of the settled co-
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defendants (e.g., GTS Construction) were foreseeable, the defense of 
superseding/intervening cause does not apply. 
In Utah, "[a] person's negligence is not superseded by the negligence of another if 
the subsequent negligence of another is foreseeable." Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 
P.2d 217, 219 (Utah 1983).30 Utah has adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
section 447, which states that if a subsequent party's acts are foreseeable to the original 
tortfeasor, the original tortfeasor is not relieved of liability/1 
Canberra and Allen qualify for all three conditions (though they need only qualify 
for one). Thus, the alleged subsequent acts of third parties were foreseeable by Canberra 
and Allen. As a result, the defense of superseding cause does not apply to immunize 
Canberra and Allen from liability. 
VTL THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED CANBERRA AND ALLEN'S 
MOTION FOR REMITTITUR. 
J
 The Court should note that the standard for applying superseding cause states 
that "[a] person's negligence is not superseded by the negligence of another . . ." 
(emphasis added). This is merely another indication that superseding cause does not 
apply to intentional torts like fraud, but rather to negligence, as argued in the previous 
section. 
n -i 
J
 The fact that "an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or 
is done in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to 
another which the actor's negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing 
about, if 
(a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized 
that a third person might so act, or 
(b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of 
the third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that 
the third person had so acted, or 
(c) the intervening act is a normal consequence of a situation created 
by the actor's conduct and the manner in which it is done is not 
extraordinarily negligent. 
Harris, 671 P.2d at 219 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 447 (1965)). 
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The Hesses presented meticulous evidence to support the jury's award of actual 
damages and pain-and-suffering damages. Therefore, the Court should affirm the 
damages award. 
Further, Canberra and Allen failed to disclose to the Court that they did not contest 
or rebut the Hesses 'pain and suffering testimony or evidence; it was entirely 
unchallenged. Therefore, because a "damage assessment is peculiarly a jury function," 
Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah App. 1993), the Court 
should leave the jury's award of actual and noneconomic damages undisturbed. 
A. Canberra and Allen Failed to Cross-examine. Rebut or Contradict the 
Hesses' Evidence and Testimony on Damages for Pain and Suffering. 
Canberra and Allen focus solely on Rule 59(a)(5) as the basis to overturn the 
jury's damages award/ Rule 59(a)(5) states that *'a new trial may be granted for . . . 
j2
 In one paragraph, Canberra and Allen also argue that the pain-and-suffering 
award is a "due process violation." (Appellants' Br. 46.) In support of this argument, 
they quote State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). 
Campbell and the selective quotes therefrom are distinguishable from this case. 
Campbell dealt with the excessiveness of punitive damages, not compensatory damages, 
which is what the jury's pain-and-suffering award is in this case. Canberra and Allen's 
cited language from Campbell reveals as much when it states that the due process 
protection against "grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor" applies to 
punitive damage awards. Id. at 416. This rule from Campbell speaks in terms of 
"punishments," which is precisely what punitive damages are intended to do: punish a 
tortfeasor. In contrast, compensatory damages to compensate the injured person for the 
loss suffered and not to punish a tortfeasor. Black's Law Dictionary 170 (2d ed. 2001). 
Because the law relating to punitive damages is sui generis, Campbell and its principles 
on punitive damages are inapplicable here. 
Regardless, Canberra and Allen did not properly raise or preserve the issue of 
whether the jury's pain-and-suffering award is a due process violation. 
3Q 
[e]xcessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice." 
Justice Crockett, in a concurring opinion, spoke sagely to the caution a court 
should possess before disturbing a jury's verdict: "courts should exercise great caution 
and forbearance in disturbing jury verdicts to the end that the important right of trial by 
jury is preserved." Stamp v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 303 P.2d 279, 282-83 (Utah 1956) 
(Crockett, J., concurring). And after the trial court "has given its approval to the award 
by refusing to set aside or modify the verdict"—exactly what happened in this case— 
that much additional verity is thereby conferred upon it and the appellate 
court, a fortiori should be more reluctant to interfere with the jury verdict 
and the judgment of the court because of their advantaged position in 
having first-hand view of the proceedings and will do so only when to 
permit it to stand would work a manifest injustice. 
Id. (emphases added). Indeed, the "trial judge is in the best position to ascertain if the 
Rule 7(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a moving party to file a 
reply memorandum, but it "shall be limited to rebuttal of matters raised in the 
memorandum in opposition." 
In their omnibus post-trial motion and memorandum in support of a JNOV, 
remittitur, etc., Canberra and Allen did not raise the due process argument in any form. 
(R. at 4048-85.) Thus, the Hesses did not address it in their opposition to the omnibus 
motion. (R. at 4143-90.) Then, for the first time in their reply memorandum, Canberra 
and Allen raised the argument that the pain-and-suffering award was a "due process 
violation." (R. at 4197^99.) 
This violated Rule 7(c)(1) because Canberra had not previously raised it, and the 
Hesses did not have an opportunity to oppose or brief the argument. The Hesses also 
objected to Canberra and Allen raising this argument for the first time in their reply 
memorandum. (R. at 4232-35.) 
Therefore, Canberra and Allen did not properly raise or preserve the due process 
argument below, they have waived it on appeal. Soriano v. Graul, 2008 UT App 188, ^ 
12-13, 186 P.3d 960, 964-65 (refusing to address a constitutional argument on appeal 
where the movant first raised the argument in his reply memorandum in the trial court: 
"[wjhere a party first raises an issue in his reply memorandum, it is not properly before 
the trial court and we will not consider it for the first time on appeal"). 
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jury has exceeded its proper bounds," and this Court will reverse "only if there is no 
reasonable basis for the decision." Diversified Holdings, L.C v. Turner, 2002 UT 129, % 
4, 63 P.3d 686, 692 (emphasis added). 
A court "cannot grant a new trial merely because it disagrees with the jury's 
judgment." Crookston, 817 P.2d at 804. Rather, evidence must exist to support the 
contention that the jury was unduly influenced by passion or prejudice. Id. In fact, the 
court should "review the propriety of the damages award and grant a new trial only where 
it is obvious that the jury lacked a reasonable basis for its decision, acted with prejudice 
or passion, or disregarded competent evidence."JD Andreason v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
848 P.2d 171, 174 (Utah App. 1993). 
A "jury is allowed great latitude in assessing damages for personal injuries." 
Duffy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 218 P.2d 1080, 1083 (Utah 1950). Even if an award 
appears excessive, the "mere excessiveness of a verdict, without more, does not 
necessarily show that the verdict was arrived at by passion or prejudice." Id. The facts 
must be "such that the excess can be determined as a matter of law . . . ." Id. 
As the jury heard, both Mark and Marilyn Hess testified about their fire-year 
3
 The Supreme Court has also recognized that pain and suffering damages are 
uniquely suited for determination by a jury. The "presumption is that jurors 
conscientiously perform their duties in accordance with their oath." Weeks v. Zarbock, 
1979 Utah LEXIS 757, *6 (Utah 1979). Further, "no set formula as to the amount of 
damages that may be awarded" exists in a case that involves "pain and suffering." 
Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934, 333 (Utah 1963). Therefore, this determination "is 
properly left to the sound judgment of a jury of practical people upon the basis of the 
evidence and in light of their experience in the affairs of life." Id.; see also Batty v. 
Mitchell, 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978) (reviewing the damages awarded against a 
negligent defendant and stating that "the amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively for 
the jury"). 
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catastrophic nightmare affected ever}7 aspect of their lives. They testified about the 
mental and emotional damage to themselves, as well as the great strain on their marriage 
and their family as they all endured their dream home slowly crumbing before their eyes. 
These experiences exemplify the very definition of mental and emotional distress. 
n
 A 
Canberra and Allen failed to challenge this testimony on cross-examination.3 
And they asked only two question of Marilyn Hess, both relating to the repairs to the 
Hesses' home. (R. at 4678:562.) Moreover, they did not offer any rebuttal evidence or 
expert testimony to contradict or rebut the Hesses testimony concerning their pain, 
suffering, and mental distress as a result of their five-year nightmare. Canberra and Allen 
utterly failed to even attempt such a rebuttal. They even avoided addressing it in their 
closing argument. 
Further, there is no evidence that the jury did anything but carefully and 
thoroughly consider all of the relevant testimony and evidence/5 Canberra and Allen's 
argument is conclusory; they have neither presented nor highlighted any specific 
evidence that would serve as the basis for the jury's alleged "passion or prejudice" in 
arriving at its damages award. 
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Price-Orem Invest Co. v. Rollins, Brown & 
^ A 
0
 In addition, Canberra and Allen did not conduct any discovery on this issue. 
D5
 Counsel for the Hesses also walked the jury through jury instruction number 36, 
the instruction on noneconomic damages, which instruction was stipulated to by the 
parties and is an accurate statement of the law, having come from MUJI CV2004. That 
instruction specifically warned and cautioned the jury not to based its damages award on 
speculation: "While you may not award damages based upon speculation, the law 
requires only that the evidence provide a reasonable basis for assessing the damages but 
does not require a mathematical certainty." (R. at 3704.) 
4? 
Gunnell, Inc., evaluated whether there was sufficient evidence to support a somewhat 
speculative damages award to the plaintiff. 784 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The court agreed with the trial court that, although the damages award was ''imprecise," 
"the evidence was not too speculative to support the damage award." Id. The court went 
on to state that "[t]he evidence presented in this case is not so meager as to invite sheer 
speculation; imprecise as it is, but counsel's arguments, the court's instructions, and the 
common sense of the jury place the evidence in proper perspective for resolution of the 
damage issue." Id at 479 n.4. 
Similarly, imprecise as any jury's pain-and-suffering award might be. in light of 
(1) the volume of testimony and evidence concerning the Hesses' pain and suffering, (2) 
Canberra and Allen's failure to contest that evidence, (3) the Hesses' counsel's 
arguments concerning the evidence, (4) the court's instruction, and (5) the jury's common 
sense, it cannot be said that the jury's award was based on ''sheer speculation/' 
Canberra and Allen cannot claim error and ask the Court to do their job for them 
by stepping into the jury's shoes and remitting the compensatory damages. The jury had 
no evidence to offset the Hesses' pain-and-suffering evidence. For the same reason, the 
trial court had a basis on which to grant remittitur. Therefore, no basis exists for 
remittitur of any portion of the jury's damages award for mental or emotional distress, 
°
6
 Moreover. Canberra and Allen's citation to a newspaper article as "evidence" of 
anything (including whether the Court should grant a remittitur) is inappropriate. 
(Appellants' Br. 48.) The article is hearsay, and it is not part of the trial evidence. It is 
evidence of nothing relevant to the Court's determination of whether the damages in this 
case were influenced by passion or prejudice (not to mention the article misquoted the 
Hesses' counsel). 
A1 
and this Court should uphold the pain-and-suffering award."3 
B. The Jury's Actual Damages Award was Proper and was Based on 
Sufficient and Competent Evidence. 
Canberra and Allen argue that the Court should reduce the jury's award of actual 
damages because they ''exceeded the competent evidence by over $215,000 . . . .*' 
(Appellants' Br. 47.) Canberra and Allen fail to marshal the evidence on this point and 
instead, argue the bare conclusion. In reality, the evidence clearly supports the jury's 
actual damages award. The jury awarded the following actual damages to the Hesses: 
• $10,617.68 as damages **for costs relating to the Hesses discovering the defects in 
their home and property." Mr. Hess testified that he received an invoice from 
Terracon for $9,752.28 (Exhibit 35, r. at 3639), and Exhibit 17 (r. at 3640), an 
invoice from Earthtec Testing for $865.40 (Exhibit 17, r. at 3640; 4677:314), for a 
total of $10,617.68. 
no 
• $319,439.62 as damages "for repairs to the Hesses* home that have already been 
D1
 In addition, the jury found both Canberra and Allen's conduct warranted an 
award of punitive damages. (R. at 4678:773-75.) 
08
 The jury actually awarded $330,057.30 for damages already incurred. (R. at 
3746.) This was a simple math error on the jury's part. The jury inadvertently included 
the $10,617.68 it had already awarded for costs to discover the defects in the award for 
repairs already incurred. During a post-trial hearing, the Hesses stipulated to remit the 
amount awarded for repairs already incurred by $10,617.68. 
This should not affect the overall jury award. If a jury commits a computation or 
similar error in arriving at its verdict, reversal is not required. Morris v Russell, 236 P.2d 
451, 456 (Utah 1951). Rather, the trial court simply determines "what portion of the 
verdict is sustainable." Id; see also Colovos v Home Life Ins Co , 28 P.2d 607, 611 
(Utah 1934) (holding that a computational defect in a verdict "is not fatal where the 
amount can be fixed by computation . . . . [T]he verdict should be upheld. . . . Strict 
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incurred." Mr. Hess testified that he received (1) an invoice from Atlas Piers for 
$24,483.00 (Exhibit 20, r. at 3640; 4677:320-21), (2) an invoice from Atlas Piers 
for $158,472.50 (Exhibit 22, r. at 3640; 4677:328), (3) an invoice from Atlas Piers 
for $28,305.00 (Exhibit 23, r. at 3640; 4677:329), and (4) an estimate for repairs to 
the home from Zion's Builders for $108,179.12 (Exhibit 27, r. at 3640; 4677:314), 
for a total of $319,439.62. 
• $206,692.70 as damages "for repairs to the Hesses' home that have yet to be 
incurred."0 
The jury likely concluded this was fair and reasonable because the Hesses' home, 
as currently constructed, does not include sidewalks, landscaping, or any structures not 
attached to the home itself. The home was built on a toxic dirt lot. If the Hesses wish to 
construct anything else on their lot—sidewalks, a swimming pool, a fence, a shed, a rock 
wall, a patio—they will be required to pay significant amounts of money to install 
additional piers. And the jury saw evidence of the cost of installing piers.40 
technical accuracy is not required in the statement of the amount, it being sufficient if it 
can be ascertained by mere mathematical calculation and the verdict is good, although the 
amount of recovery is stated by reference to the amount claimed in the petition or can be 
ascertained by reference thereto'5). 
on 
The jury came up with its award of $206,692.70 because it is the difference 
between the amounts it had already awarded for discovering the damage and for repairs 
already incurred (a combined total of $330,057.30) and the stipulated fair market value of 
the home ($536,750.00), for an award of $206,692.70. The parties stipulated to jury 
instruction number 18, which reads in relevant part: "Plaintiffs and Defendants agree that 
the fair market value of the Hesses' home, after all settlement-related damages have been 
fully repaired, would be $536,750.00. If you decide to award the Plaintiffs damages for 
the cost of discovering the damage and the actual repairs (structural and cosmetic), the 
award cannot exceed $536,750.00." (R. at 3722.) 
40
 For example, Exhibit 20 documents that the installation of 16 piers cost 
AS 
The jury awarded the Hesses for likely future expenses directly related to the 
forever-tarnished lot and home within the parameters established by the stipulated jury 
instruction, and therefore, the damage award should stand. 
C. The Statutory Cap on Noneconomic Damages in Medical Malpractice 
Actions does not Apply Outside the Medical Malpractice Realm. 
Canberra and Allen urge the Court should apply Utah Code Ann. sec. 78B-3-410, 
the statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases, to this case. 
But because this is not a medical malpractice case, and because this case does not invoke 
the same public policy implications, the statute is inapposite and does not govern. 
The medical malpractice cap statute begins with a limiting phrase, stating that it 
applies "[i]n a malpractice action against a health care provider." Utah Code Ann. § 
78B-3-410(l). This alone precludes its application in this case. 
But in addition, the Utah Supreme Court stated that the statute was based upon the 
$24,483.00. Further, Exhibit 22 documents that the installation of 84 piers cost 
$158,472.50. Also, the jury saw evidence demonstrating the necessity of additional pier 
installation on the Hesses' lot for any future structure that may be built. Therefore, the 
jury's forward-looking award for repairs to the Hesses9 home that have yet to be incurred 
acknowledges and anticipates future issues on the lot associated with soil problems. 
Moreover, the home could settle further, and it could also require future repairs. 
The jury heard testimony from Mr. Hess, Mr. Jim Nordquist (the Hesses' engineering 
expert), and even Defendant Allen that the Hesses' lot had significant soil problems and 
that future problems could occur. In addition, Mr. David Morley, the Hesses' general 
contractor who will repair the home, testified that even after attempting all repairs, there 
will be some problems that can never be fully remedied or brought back to their original 
condition. For example, the two exterior walls that have separated seven to eight inches 
will never be pulled together, but Mr. Morley will merely be able to do "a cosmetic" 
repair as opposed to ''anything structural. . . . " (R. at 4677:405.) And some walls will be 
"permanently" out of square. (R. at 4677:406.) And the structural beam that juts out 
from the deck will have to be left that way, with it re-stuccoed and re-painted for 
cosmetic purposes. (R. at 4677:406.) 
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"legislature's determination that it needed to respond to the perceived medical 
malpractice crisis" and that statute was written as an "action designed to control costs." 
Juddv. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, j^ 16, 103 P.3d 135. 
There is no "construction defect crisis" analogous to the medical malpractice 
crisis, which was the basis for the statutory cap on noneconomic damages against 
doctors. The Court should not apply the medical malpractice statute to this case. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE JURY'S FINDING 
THAT CANBERRA AND ALLEN ARE LIABLE FOR FRAUDULENT 
MISREPRESENTATION TO MR. HESS. 
Canberra and Allen argue Mr. Hess did not prove the elements of fraudulent 
misrepresentation.41 (Appellants' Br. 33.) The evidence and testimony at trial proves 
otherwise. 
Using the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation as the guide, the Court can see 
that the evidence supports the jury's finding that Canberra and Allen are liable for 
fraudulent misrepresentation to Mr. Hess. 
1. The jury found that Canberra and Allen made a false or misleading 
statement. On the Seller's Property Condition Disclosure Form, Defendants left 
the line blank below the question that read: "Is there anything else which you 
should disclose to Buyer because it may materially or adversely affect the value or 
desirability of the Property?" (Add. C.) Immediately below the blank line, it 
read, in all capital letters: "[DEFENDANT] REPRESENTS THAT, TO THE 
BEST OF SELLER'S KNOWLEDGE, THE INFORMATION SET FORTH IN 
THE FOREGOING DISCLOSURE STATEMENT IS ACCURATE AND 
COMPLETE." And immediately below that, Defendant Allen signed this form. 
As jury instruction number 30 states,42 a party can commit fraud by silence, so the 
41
 The parties stipulated to the jury instructions on fraudulent misrepresentation, 
which were instructions 23-29. (R. at 3711-17.) 
42
 The parties also stipulated to jury instruction number 30, the "fraud by silence" 
instruction, which states that "[a] person or entity can commit fraud by silence. (R. at 
AH 
fact that Canberra and Allen obtained the AGEC Report, read it, and did not 
disclose it to the Hesses is fraud by silence, thus satisfying the first element. 
2. The jury rightly concluded that Canberra and Allen either knew the 
statement (or absence of the statement) on the seller's disclosure form was false or 
misleading, or that Canberra and Allen made it with reckless disregard for its truth 
or falsity. The "fraud by silence'' instruction applies to this prong as well. 
3. The jury found that the statement was of material fact. This was a 
fact question for the jury, and they clearly felt the AGEC Report was material 
because it related to the transaction in question and was relevant to the Hesses' 
decision to enter into the transaction. Moreover, that Canberra and Allen knew7 
there were soil problems in the development would "materially or adversely affect 
the value or desirability of [lot 41]," so they should have disclosed the AGEC 
Report in the Seller's Disclosure. 
4. The jury concluded that Canberra and Allen made the statement (or 
failed to make the statement, as with fraud by silence) with the intent that Mr. 
Hess would rely on the false or misleading representation by purchasing lot 41. 
5. The jury found that Mr. Hess reasonably relied on the false or 
misleading representation. Indeed, Mr. Hess testified that he would have backed 
out of the transaction had he known about the AGEC Report. (R. at 4677:261-64.) 
6. Without dispute, Mr. Hess suffered damages as a result of relying on 
the false representation. (E.g., r. at 4677:269-77.) 
Thus, the jury properly concluded that Canberra and Allen are liable for fraudulent 
misrepresentation,43 which the trial court affirmed. 
IX. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES, 
4678:690; 3710.) Silence, in order to be actionable fraud, must relate to a material matter 
known to the party and which it is his legal duty to communicate to the other contracting 
party." (R. at 3710.) 
4j
 Canberra and Allen also argue that Mr. Hess should have offered expert 
testimony on duty in support of his fraudulent misrepresentation claim. But as the Court 
can see, fraudulent misrepresentation does not have a "duty" element. Therefore, in 
addition to the Hesses' argument supra concerning expert testimony and duty vis-a-vis 
the Hesses' fraudulent nondisclosure claim, which the Hesses incorporate to this section, 
it would have been unnecessary and illogical for Mr. Hess to provide expert testimony on 
"duty" for his fraudulent misrepresentation claim. 
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A. The Jury Based its Allocation of Fault Upon Sufficient Competent 
Evidence. 
Remittitur is generally reserved as a method for a trial court to reduce a jury's 
award of damages, and not to change a jury's allocation of fault. See Utah State Road 
Comm }n v. Johnson, 550 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1976). Furthermore, apportionment of 
fault is a role reserved for a fact-finding jury. Godesky v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d 
541, 544 (Utah 1984) (stating that determining relative fault is a question for the jury). 
The jury instructions clearly informed the jury how to apportion fault. The Hesses 
introduced a significant amount of competent, relevant, and probative evidence that 
demonstrated Canberra and Allen's liability for the damages to the Hesses' home and lot. 
Canberra and Allen argue that the jury apportioned 80% of the damages to 
Canberra/Allen because "the jury believed its job was to allocate 80% of the costs to 
[Canberra and Allen] and 20% of the costs to the remaining parties." (Appellants' Br. 
45.) 
There is no evidence or indication that the jury "believed" it was supposed to 
allocate the fault as Mr. Nordquist testified.44 The jury was free to disregard any 
testimony and draw its own conclusions. And jury instruction number 32, which 
Canberra and Allen demanded be given over the Hesses' objection and motion in limine, 
instructed the jury to allocate fault "based upon how much that person's or entity's fault 
contributed to the harm/' (R. at 3708.) Because the jury awarded 80% to Canberra and 
Mr. Hess also testified—consistent with Mr. Nordquist—that he was "looking 
for . . . 80% [of his damages from Canberra and Allen]." (R. at 4678:475-76.) 
4Q 
Allen, it could be deduced that the jury found Mr. Nordquist credible. 
The jury apportioned liability among five parties,46 and the evidence presented at 
trial supports this allocation. Therefore, any alterations to the jury's fault determinations 
are not justified, and this Court should uphold the jury's apportionment of liability. 
R The Hesses' "'Golden Rule" Argument was Proper. 
Canberra and Allen also argue that the Hesses erred by using the phrase 
"reasonable man" and by asking the jury to step into the shoes of the Hesses. After 
reviewing the Hesses5 memorandum on the matter (r. at 3621-37), the trial court correctly 
concluded that the Hesses' argument was proper. 
"[T]he use of golden rule arguments is improper only with respect to damages." 
Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62 % 36, 29 P.3d 638, 648. But the use of the "golden rule" 
argument is perfectly proper "when urged on the issue of ultimate liability." Id. 
The Hesses spoke only to the issue of ultimate liability, as Canberra and Allen 
seem to concede. (Appellants' Br. 39 n.12.) Therefore, there was no error. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm both the jury's verdict and the 
trial court's unequivocal endorsement of that verdict. 
It is also worth noting that even though Mr. Nordquist testified that "[t]he 
natural clay soil that was found to be collapsible would attribute up to 80 percent [of the 
amount of settlement that the house experienced]" (r. at 4677:186-87), he did not split 
that percentage further. The jury independently found Canberra 45% liable and Allen 
35% liable. (R. at 3745.) 
46
 The jury carefully apportioned 35% of the fault to Allen, 45% to Canberra, 17% 
to GTS, 2% to Earthtec, 1% to the Hesses, and 0% to DaM. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The'subsurface soils at the site consists predominantly of clayey and siity gravel 
with cobbles and boulders. Occasional clay and silt layers were encountered, The 
location of silt and clay layers across the site is "erratic. ' 
No free water was encountered in the test pits at the time of excavation, 
The site is suitable for the proposed residential development. Recommendations 
contained in this report should be carefully followed. 
The residences may be supported on spread footings be^rerer on the undisturbed 
natural SDII or on compacted structural fill and may be designed for an allowable net 
bearing pressure of 1/500 pounds pBr square foot Footings bearing on at least 2 
feet of compacted structural fill or 2 feet of the natural gravel soil may be designed 
using an allowable net bearing pressure of 2,500 pounds per square foot. 
.Mpistuira.sensitive, soils: havie bem^epfrrtad. in- the area. Precautions with respect 
to.constructing in moisture sensitive so/I areas are included iri the report, 
Geotechnica! information related to foundations, subgrade preparation and materials 
are included in the report 
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SCOPE 
Th,s report presents the results of e geolog.c and geoteohmcal ,nvesbBat,on for the proposed 
C b r a H e U Phase I subd,v,s,o„ to be .ooated at M*n,ey Dnve =, Canberra Dnve ,„ Lrndon, 
U t l see J u r e
 21. The report presents the 0,0,00,0 and subsurface cond,t,o„s encountered, 
Ora to ry test resuits end recommendations for foundations. The study was conduoted ,n 
accordance with our proposal dated February 2B, 1997. 
Held exploration was oonduoted to obtam information on the subsurface eond.t.on. Samples 
„ b l e d during the field investigation were tested in the laboratory to determ.ne phys,ca, and 
« h racteristios of the on-sHe so,,. Information obtained from the fieid and Moratory 
r " to define oonditions at the site for ou, endearing anaiysis and to develop 
recommendation for the proposed building foundations. 
Thisreporthasbeen prepared to summarize the dataobtainedduringthegeologic andgeotechnical 
I " i l n d to prese t our oonciusions and recommendatJons based on the propose constn.ctto 
r i s l o condfdons enoountered. Design parameters and a d . s o u ^ n 0 geologrc and 
; : : : l i o a , engineering considerations related to c o n a t i o n are inoiuded ,„ the report. 
SITE CONDITIONS 
The * , is ,ocated on the benoh of Mt. Timpanogas, be,ow Dr, Canyon and Sumac Hoilow. The 
Z Z I L onha site fa„s approximately along aievation 5240 and the western port,on of the 
I s a g the easement for the Sal, La.e Agueduc, The site extends from aPprox,mat y 200 
arte falls along the
 T h p D r 0 D e r t v is located partially on alluvia, fans formed atthe 
Nnrth to 200 South |see Figure 2). The property is rocaio H 
Morth l
 d r a i n o h a n n e | e x t e n d B t h r o u g t l t h B 
portion of the property. 
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The property was vacant of permanent structures atthe time of our investigat ion, The Salt Lake 
Aqueduct borders the west edge of the property, Several dirt roads e>ctend th rough the property 
gt various locations, 
e The site encompasses a hillside that slopes downward from northeast to sou thwes t . Slopes inth 
northern portion of the site range from approximately 10 to 50 percent With some steeper slopes 
in drainage areas. The slopes inthe southern portion of the property range f r o m approximately 10 
percent In the southern and western portion of the area'to as steep as 50 percent in the eastern 
portion of the site and some steeper slopes in the Dry Canyon drainage. 
Vegetation atthe site consists predominantly of grass, sagebrush and oak brush. 
The surrounding area includes the undeveloped slopes to the north and eas t , existing residences 
to the south and subdivisions under construction to the west. There is a debris basin on Dry 
Canyon, northeast of the site approximately 1/3 mile. 
FIELD STUDY 
The field study was conducted on March 7, 1997. Twelve test pits w e r e excavated for the 
geotechnical investigation atthe approximate locations indicated on Figure 2 . The test pits were 
excavated with a track excavator. Excavations were logged and soil samples obtained by an 
engineer from AGEC. Logs of the subsurface conditions encountered in the test pits are 
graphically shown on Figure 3 with Legend and Notes on Figure 4. 
GEOLOGIC STUDY 
Geologic conditions at the site were evaluated by review of aerial photographs, a review of 
geologic literature and reconnaissance of the site. The general geology o f the site and vicinity is 
presented on Figure 1. 
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Regional Geology 
Lindon is located in the Basin and Range province. The province is made up of north/south 
elongated mountain blocks and valleys, Utah Valley is one of the valleys in the province w i th the 
Wasatch Mountains forming the eastern boundary of the valley 
The project is located below the mouth of Dry Canyon. The canyon is a stream cut drainage w i t h 
a well developed alluvial fan at its mouth, 
Utah Valley was once occupied by a large lake known as Lake Bonneville during the Wisconsin 
Glacial Period of the Pleistocene Age, The present day Great Salt Lake is a remnant of Anc ient 
Lake Bonneville. Stillstands of Lake Bonneville formed benches along t he Wasatch Front. The 
highest level of Lake Bonneville is marked by a bench, the Bonneville Shoreline, at approximate 
elevation 5150 feet. The lake remained at this high level from 17 to 15 thousand years before 
present, until it dropped approximately 350 feet during a catastrophic f lood known as the 
Bonneville Flood (Currey and Dviatt, 1985 and Jarrett and Malde, 1987}, This lower stl l lstand of 
Lake Bonneville is the Provo, which formed at approximate elevation 4 8 00 feet. 
Mast of the site is located just below the Bonneville shoreline leveL 
Tectonic Setting 
The qrte is located In the Salt Lake Valley along the western Wasatch Front, which is a prominent 
mountain front escarpment extending approximately 240 miies from southern Idaho to north-
central Utah- The prominent west facing steep escarpment of the Wasatch Mountain Front is the 
result of repeated normal fault displacements which have taken place over the last several million 
years* The system of normal faults which makes up this escarpment is known collectively as the 
Wasatch Fault, Relatively recent fault movements are evidenced by of fsets in Lake Bonneville 
sediments and more recent alluvial and colluvial deposits, 
The Wasatch Fault is considered to be made up of several segments, each segment acting 
relatively independently (Machette and Others, 1987], The site is located along the American Fork 
sub-segment of the Provo rupture segment (Machette/ 19B9), 
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Ritp Geology 
Surface deposits of the property consist predominantly of alluvial fan deposits, Soils are 
anticipated to be relatively deep with a depth to bedrock greater than 10O feet. 
SUBSOIL CONDITIONS 
bsurface soils at the site consist predominantly of clayey and silty gravel with cobbles and 
Occasional clay and silt layers were encountered within the gravel, The location of silt 
The su 
boulders 
and clay layers across the site is erratic 
A description of the various soils encountered in the test pits follows: 
T o D 5 D i l -The topsoll consists of silty and clayey gravel to sandy lean clay with gravel. It 
is moist, dark brown in color and contains roots and organics. 
j pan HIRV and Silt - The clay and silt is interlayered. Jt is sandyr medium stiff, moist and 
light brown to brownish gray in color. 
Laboratory tests conducted on samples of the clay and silt indicate natural moisture 
contents range from 15 to 22 percent and natural dry densities range from 87 to 9 6 pounds 
per cubic foot (pcf). A sample of the clay was found to have an unconfined compressive 
strength of 3,445 pounds per square foot (psf). Consolidation tests conducted on samples 
of the clay and silt indicate that the soil will under go a "moderate" to "high" amount of 
compression with the additional of light to moderate loads. Some collapse of the soil 
occurred with the addition of water. Some of the compression indicated by the 
consolidation tests is attributed to disturbance of the sample during sampling. Results of 
the consolidation tests are presented of Figures 5 and 6. 
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r , The s„ty grave, contains clayey 9-vel layers It also contains cobbles and 
^ ^
m l
 '
 T Y
 , ,
 f p p t in s l z e and occasional boulders up to approximately 5 
boulders up to approximately 2 fee
 r o w n l s h g r a y l D „ g h t b r o Wn ,n color. 
feat.ns,ZB It ,s medium dense to dense, mo.st and 
i nf the aravel indicate natural moisture contents 
range from 9 to 30 percent The results gr 
gravel are presented on Figure 7, 
™rf on Table 1 and are included on the Logs of Exploratory Test 
Laboratory test results are summarized on Table 
Pits. 
SUBSURFACE AND SURFACE WATER 
t n ,n the exploratory test pits at the time of excavation. We 
N o f r e e water was e n — . * . « P ^ ^ w ^ g r e a t e r t h a n 4 0 
anticipate that the normal honest elevation of ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
fart below the ground surface. No swamps, springs 
site. 
PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION 
smgie-family PUD development in the northern 
We understand that it is proposed to constr 
nmDosed to construct a town home 
pomon of the property, approx.mateiy B « ™ m " "
 w h | c h „ a p p r o x , m a t 8 l y 6 acres ,n . » 
deve.opment ,nthe southwestern ponon of the «
 w h l c h „ a p p r o x , m a t e l y 
L. r,+r*i n^H pastern portion ot tne prupei Ly; 
::r::: err::!.«*-- -—of the s,te 
we « « - — «** * P:^;:::;::r;0::::r 
^ +raffirforthe proposed roads consisting OT I , volumes We have assumed traffic tor me P 
trucks per day and 2 garbage trucks per week. 
Page 8 
If the proposed construction or traffic are significantly different from those described above, we 
should be notified to re-evaluate our recommendations. 
GEOLOGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
A geologic hazard review Df the site and vicinity was performed which included seismic, rock fall, 
landslide and debris flow hazards. 
Seismic Considerations 
1. Surface Fault Rupture 
The closest fault trace of the Wasatch Fault is located approximately 300 to 400 
fe-etto the northeast of the east edge of the property. No evidence of surface fault 
rupture can be identified at the property from field reconnaissance and aerial 
photograph review. 
2. Ground Shaking 
The project is in an area which has a moderately, high risk of experiencing strong 
ground shaking related to potential earthquake activity. The site is located in 
Uniform Building Code Seismic Zone 3. We recommend that the buildings be 
constructed conforming to the Uniform Building Code Seismic Zone 3 standards 
using a soil profile type "S-2". 
3. Landslide Considerations 
Along the American Fork sub-segment of the Wasatch Fault Zone south of American 
Fork Canyon, the Manning Canyon shale is exposed in the lower part of the 
Wasatch range. The shale is particularly susceptible t o landsliding, often 
incorporating large blocks of bedrock. Landslides^ Holocene and Pleistocene to 
Late Tertiary age are prominent along the Wasatch Front f rom the American Fork 
Canyon to the Provo vicinity, Several landslides have been identified along the fault 
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2 o ne east o, the P rope r The landslides are of the Upper Plerstocen to PP r 
T e m a r y t,me end appear to be assorted w,th earthouaKe act.vrty MecheUe 
I B B B | Cuff and others hava idantif.ed an area of "possible landsl.de debns wh,ch 
e x t e „ds into the north corner of the property Muff end others, 19731. 
Reconnaissance of the arte and review of aerial photographs do not indicate 
ey,de„ce of landsl.de atthe property. We fee, that the relatively fiat s.opes presen 
and the soil types encountered in the test p,ts excavated at the site rnd.cate that 
iandslide potential is minimal, if proper site grading practices are fotlowed. 
Debris F1""" Considerations 
^ ^ - ^ d T a r the mouth of Dry Canyon which is a well-deve oped 
™ h i . = we,, deveioped a„uv,e, fan at its mouth. The p r o b a c y of debns 
, : or- I n a J from the drainage is dependant en the probability of an extreme 
1 1 condJcn in combination * fire, drought or other d a m a ^ occurrences 
b asi„ was constructed in 1BB4 to mfngate the ris. of debns flow. The as n h 
Z s, height of 23 feat, a hydrauiic height of 21 * r f and a capac, y of , 1 ac 
The State of Utah indicated that a hydrologic analysis of the bas.n was 
r d u r d n L U n g i n e e r i n g a n d t h a t a s t u d y o f t h e b e s i n b y the State of Utah 
Dam Safety Division is to be conducted this year. 
rniian^ible Soil CpjTsia^mtions 
^ ^ - ^ 7 d r y , low density soils which undergo a decrease ,n 
w e n they become wet. The decrease in volume may occur without change 
These typas of soils are generally found inaridto semi-arid enwonmenta, 
::;:jr;reoiian « ^ , » * , - •— - - -
debris flows or with unconsolidated colluvial deposits. 
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The collapse potential of the soils at the project site have been identified to be very 
low to high on a scale of very law, low, moderate, high and very high (Rollins and 
Owensr 1988). Most of the property is within the area mapped as very low collapse 
potential, The central portion of the site, along the Dry Canyon drainage, is mapped 
as moderate. This ranking system is intended to alert the user or land owner to 
areas where collapsible soils are more likely to be found. The potential fo r 
collapsible soils at the site was evaluated by wetting the samples during the 
consolidation tests. Results of the consolidation tests indicate a moderate potential 
for collapse in the clay/silt soil with approximately 3 percent collapse occurring 
during wetting of the sample, 
Most of the soils present within the study area consist of coarse granular soiis 
which are typically not moisture sensitive. However, there appears to be localized 
areas of collapsible soils. We were not able to identify specific areas of concern due 
to the erratic nature of the clay and silt soils at the site. W i t h the known erratic 
occurrence; we suggest that the owners be aware of t he potentially moisture 
sensitive soils in the area and that the excavation observations and drainage 
precautions contained in the geotechnical recommendations of this report be 
carefully followed, 
6. Rock Fall 
Based on Dur site reconnaissance, there is one relatively small potential source of 
rock which could reach the site if it were dislodged from t he hillside above, The 
rock source is approximately 5 to 6 feet in diameter and is located approximately 
500 to 600 feet northeast of the northernmost drainage which extends through the 
site. It is nearly in line with the north property boundary. Based on our analysis; 
it is possible that rocks could roll from the rock source, down through the 
northernmost drainage which extends through the Single Family PUD portion of the 
site. 
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e 
T h e rock source » reiat.veiy small and we anticipate that the rock tail hazar cpuid 
L
 m,t,gated by removing, the rock source or btea.no the rock up to p a r t e s iess 
t h a n approximately 1 toot ,„ size (which are not expected tc re.cn the deveiopment 
„ M l Alternatively, a rock fall barrier could be p r o v e d a, the top of the 
northernmost drainage above the Single Family PUD area 
QEOTECHNICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
BaSed on tha subsoi, conditions encountered, laoorato^ test results, and the proposed 
constructs, the fo ld ing recommendations are given. 
A. S S . that on,y minor amounts of site grading w . he r a i t e d to construct the 
" d l e l c p m e n , Cuts and fills may be reused to f a c i l e construction ,„ the 
northern and eastern portions of the property. 
' ' S U n t cut slopes of up to 10 feet should be desrgned no steeper than 2:1 
Z L - . - « " « . . . Larger cuts shouid be considered on an individual bas.s. 
RU slopes compacted to at least 90 percent cf the mS*,mum dry density as 
Z l - L c t e d on 2.1 ihorizonta, to vertica,,. Good drainage shouid be 
provided upslope of the fill. 
Undsceprng maintenance and surface protectron may determine the most desirable 
slopes. 
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2 Excavation 
We anticipate that excavation at the site can be accomplished with typical 
excavation equipment. Some difficulty can be expected when large boulders are 
encountered. 
3, Materials, 
Materials placed as fill to support the foundations should be non-expansive granular 
soil. The on-site sand and gravel exclusive Qf any oversized material are suitable for 
use as structural fill. The clay and silt soils are not suitable for structural fill, but 
may be used in landscaping or under pavement areas, 
4 . Surface Drainage 
With the moisture sensitive soils present at the site, it is important that in areas 
where moisture sensitive soils are encountered the following drainage precautions 
be observed during construction and maintained at all times after the residences 
have been completed. 
a. Excessive wetting or drying of soils in foundation excavations should be 
avoided. 
p. The ground surface surrounding the exterior of the residences should be 
sloped to drain away from the structures in all directions, maintaining aslope 
of at least 1/2 foot in 10 feet for a distance of at least 10 feet away from 
the buildings. 
c. The upper 2 feet of foundation wall backfill should be low permeable clay 
soils. 
d. Downspouts and drains should discharge well beyond the limits of all backfill, 
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The spnnKler I n . , and « . * * ! « toads should not be placed w,th,n 10 feet 
of the foundation wails 
B, £oundjiion§-
1
 • ^ ^ o t d construct™ and
 ths suhsurfacs condmons encountered, we 
n I t the foundafons ba supported on spread focfngs beannB on the 
r i : i 3 : " 1 P - — * — — « • s h o u , d exMnd 
down to undisturbed natural soils. 
2 , BUrjnaProsjsum c l s o i l s m a y u n d e r g 0 a 
Based onth,s cons
 rt. F o o t i n s s should have a minimum 
besi8ned usino an allowable net bearing pressure of 2,500 psf. 
'• SSt - - — — — ' - " " " ""•"""" 
,nches bBlow grade for frost protection. 
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5 Fgjjndjtif in_Bai! 
The base of all excavations should be cleared of loose or deleterious material pnor 
to fill or concrete placement. 
6. £p j i i t r i l f rH n n Observation 
A representative ofthegeotechnical engineer should observe a l l foot ing excavations 
pnor to structural fill or concrete placement. This is particularly important w i th the 
potential for moisture sensitive soils in the area, 
C. r.nnr.rete Shhs-nn-Grade 
1. Slab Support 
The concrete slabs may be supported on the natural soil or on compacted structural 
2, Slab Joints 
A positive joint should be provided between the bearing wal ls and the floor slab to 
allow unrestrained vertical movement. 
3, I InHp.rslab Gravel 
A minimum 4 inch layer of free draining gravel should be placed beneath the slab. 
D. SnhRiirface Drains 
No free water was encountered at the time of the investigation, however, the interlayered 
clay and gravel may result ,n perched water conditions, or highly permeable layers may 
transmit water to the subgrade portion of the buildings during t imes of rainfall or snow 
malt. Consideration should be given to installing a permanent underdrain system for 
subgrade construction. 
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The underdre.n system shouid e n . , * of P-phera, dra.ns on the be, ow grade portion of the 
l i t , ,eadmS to a sump where water can be removed by pump.ng or Brsv„y f low. 
Th L , n ne, should cons.s, of . perforated or open
 J0,nted p,pe surrounde by free 
l i n o . Brave,. The dra,n „nes should be placed a, least ,B inches below the floor leva 
rov d free dra.nage of the water. Three-Barter ,„ch washed rock or s . m i l a r — 
w o u , d be satisfactory dra.naoe 0rave,. Drains shouid be e j e c t e d to the grave, baclcf, 
Z under slab grave,. ,„ craw, space construct™, the ground surface shou,d be sioped 
to drain into the underdram. 
Ei y^eL^slybie_5uJf^tes 
Two samples of the nature, sci, were tested in the Moratory for water so.uble sulfate 
Z Z B - H s of the tests indicate that there is less than „ . , percent water solutte 
« " in the soil. Based on the results of thetestand published iiterature, the natural so,, 
* l f g U , sulfate attachpotentia, on concrete. No specie, eementtype ,spurred 
ro rc re t !pLed i ncont rac ,w i th then a tu ra ,so ,0*ercond 1 t i ons m = y d 1 c t= te the t y pe 
of cement to be used in concrete at the site. 
Pavement 
Based en the subsoil condftions encountered, laboratory test results and the assumed 
traffic, the following pavement support recommendations ere
 B ,ven. 
1
" ^ t ^ c T s o , , consists primarily of siity and clayey grave, w,th some s,„ and 
day areas. A Cafrfornia Bearing Ratio |CBR) of 3 and 20 percent was assumed ,n 
the a„a,ys,s, which assumes a Cay and grave, subgrade, respectrveiy. 
' ^ ^ h ^ o T o o n d i t i o n s , anticipated *aff,c, methods presented by the Ufa 
Department cf Transportation and a design „fe of 20 years, a flexible pavement 
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section consisting of 3 inches of asphaltic concrete overlying 8 inches of base 
course may be used in clay subgrade areas, The base course thickness could be 
reduced to 6 inches in gravel subgrade areas. 
3, Pm/nment Material 
Pavement materials should meet the Utah Department of Transportation 
•specifications for gradation and quality, The pavement th ickness indicated above 
assumes the base course is high quality material with a CBR of at least 80 percent. 
Other materials may be considered for use in the pavement sec t ion . The use of 
other materials may result in different pavement material thicknesses-, 
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LIMITATIONS 
„
 rt has been prepared ,n accordance w,th general.y accepted geolog.c and geotechnlca, 
Th,s report has been P ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T h e c o n c l u s l o n s 
engineering practices in information obtained from the 
_„„,4„™n<i included within the report are oasm 
^
 r T m : i ! a t t rooat lon indicated on the site plan and the data obtained frorh Moratory 
te? J o ! * e subsurface c o l o n s ntay not hecome ev,d Ent until addition* 
testing Variations
 subsur faoe soil or groundwater conditions are found 
Explora«on or excavation ,s oonduc * ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
, „ be dfferent than what is described in this report, 
recommendations given. 
APPLIED QEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS, INC. 
Jay R. McQuivBy, P.E. 
Reviewed by Dofiglas R Hawkes, P E., P b 
JRM/cs 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1. The subsurface soils at the site consists predominantly of clayey and silty gravel 
wi th cobbles and boulders. Occasional clay and silt layers were encountered The 
location of silt and clay layers across the site is erratic 
2. No free water was encountered in the test pits at the time of excavation 
3. The site is suitable for the proposed residential development Recommendations 
contained in this report should be carefully followed. 
4. The residences may be supported on spread footings bearing on the undisturbed 
natural soil or on compacted structural fill and may be designed for an allowable net 
bearing pressure of 1,500 pounds per square foot Footings bearing on at least 2 
feet of compacted structural fill or 2 feet of the natural gravel soil may be designed 
using an allowable net bearing pressure of 2,500 pounds per square foot 
5. Moisture sensitive soils have been reported in the area. Precautions with respect 
to constructing in moisture sensitive soil areas are included in the report 
6. Geotechnical information relatedtofoundations, subgrade preparation and materials 
are included in the report. 
SCOPE 
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This report presents the results of a geologic and geotechnical investigation for the proposed 
Canberra Heights, Phase I subdivision to be located at Mckinley Drive at Canberra Drive in Lindon, 
Utah (see Figure 2). The report presents the geologic and subsurface conditions encountered, 
laboratory test results and recommendations for foundations. The study was conducted in 
accordance wi th our proposal dated February 26, 1997. 
Field exploration was conducted to obtain information on the subsurface conditions. Samples 
obtained during the field investigation were tested in the laboratory to determine physical and 
engineering characteristics of the on-site soil. Information obtained from the field and laboratory 
was used to define conditions at the site for our engineering analysis and to develop 
recommendation for the proposed building foundations 
This report has been prepared to summarize the data obtained during the geologic and geotechnical 
studies and to present our conclusions and recommendations based on the proposed construction 
and subsurface conditions encountered. Design parameters and a discussion of geologic and 
geotechnical engineering considerations related to construction are included in the report. 
SITE CONDITIONS 
The site is located on the bench of Mt Timpanogas, below Dry Canyon and Sumac Hollow. The 
eastern edge of the site falls approximately along elevation 5240 and the western portion of the 
site falls along the easement for the Salt Lake Aqueduct The site extends from approximately 200 
North to 200 South (see Figure 2) The property is located partially on alluvial fans formed at the 
mouth of Dry Canyon and Sumac Hollow. The Dry Canyon drainage channel extends through the 
southern portion of the property and the Sumac Hollow drainage crosses through the north-central 
portion of the property 
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The property was vacant of permanent structures at the time of our investigation The Salt Lake 
Aqueduct borders the west edge of the property Several dirt roads extend through the property 
at various locations 
The site encompasses a hillside that slopes downward from northeast to southwest Slopes in the 
northern portion of the site range from approximately 10 to 50 percent with some steeper slopes 
in drainage areas. The slopes in the southern portion of the property range from approximately 1 0 
percent in the southern and western portion of the area to as steep as 50 percent in the eastern 
portion of the site and some steeper slopes in the Dry Canyon drainage 
Vegetation at the site consists predominantly of grass, sagebrush and oak brush 
The surrounding area includes the undeveloped slopes to the north and east, existing residences 
to the south and subdivisions under construction to the west There is a debris basin on Dry 
Canyon, northeast of the site approximately 1/3 mile 
FIELD STUDY 
The field study was conducted on March 7', 1997 Twelve test pits were excavated for the 
geotechnical investigation at the approximate locations indicated on Figure 2 The test pits were 
excavated with a track excavator Excavations were logged and soil samples obtained by an 
engineer from AGEC Logs of the subsurface conditions encountered in the test pits are 
graphically shown on Figure 3 with Legend and Notes on Figure 4 
GEOLOGIC STUDY 
Geologic conditions at the site were evaluated by review of aerial photographs, a review of 
geologic literature and reconnaissance of the site The general geology of the site and vicinity is 
presented on Figure 1. 
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Regional Geology 
Lindon is located in the Basin and Range province. The province is made up of north/south 
elongated mountain blocks and valleys. Utah Valley is one of the valleys in the province with the 
Wasatch Mountains forming the eastern boundary of the valley. 
The project is located below the mouth of Dry Canyon. The canyon is a stream cut drainage with 
a well developed alluvial fan at its mouth 
Utah Valley was once occupied by a large lake known as Lake Bonneville during the Wisconsin 
Glacial Period of the Pleistocene Age. The present day Great Salt Lake is a remnant of Ancient 
Lake Bonneville. Stillstands of Lake Bonneville formed benches along the Wasatch Front. The 
highest level of Lake Bonneville is marked by a bench, the Bonneville Shoreline, at approximate 
elevation 51 50 feet. The lake remained at this high level from 1 7 to 15 thousand years before 
present, until it dropped approximately 350 feet during a catastrophic flood known as the 
Bonneville Flood (Currey and Oviatt, 1 985 and Jarrett and Malde, 1 987) This lower stillstand of 
Lake Bonneville is the Provo, which formed at approximate elevation 4800 feet. 
Most of the site is located just below the Bonneville shoreline level. 
Tectonic Setting 
The site is located in the Salt Lake Valley along the western Wasatch Front, which is a prominent 
mountain front escarpment extending approximately 240 miles from southern Idaho to north-
central Utah. The prominent west facing steep escarpment of the Wasatch Mountain Front is the 
result of repeated normal fault displacements which have taken place over the last several million 
years. The system of normal faults which makes up this escarpment is known collectively as the 
Wasatch Fault. Relatively recent fault movements are evidenced by offsets in Lake Bonneville 
sediments and more recent alluvial and colluvial deposits. 
The Wasatch Fault is considered to be made up of several segments, each segment acting 
relatively independently (Machette and Others, 1 987). The site is located along the American Fork 
sub-segment of the Provo rupture segment (Machette, 1989). 
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Site Geology 
Surface deposils of the property consist predominantly of alluvial fan deposits Soils are 
anticipated to be relatively deep with a depth to bedrock greater than 100 feet. 
SUBSOIL CONDITIONS 
The subsurface soils at the site consist predominantly of clayey and silty gravel with cobbles and 
boulders. Occasional clay and silt layers were encountered within the gravel The location of silt 
and clay layers across the site is erratic 
A description of the various soils encountered in the test pits follows. 
Topsoil The topsoil consists of silty and clayey gravel to sandy lean clay with gravel It 
is moist, dark brown in color and contains roots and organics 
Lean Clay and Silt - The clay and silt is interlayered It is sandy, medium stiff, moist and 
light brown to brownish gray in color. 
Laboratory tests conducted on samples of the clay and silt indicate natural moisture 
contents range from 1 5 to 22 percent and natural dry densities range from 87 to 96 pounds 
per cubic foot (pcf) A sample of the clay was found to have an unconfmed compressive 
strength of 3,445 pounds per square foot (psf) Consolidation tests conducted on samples 
of the clay and silt indicate that the soil will under go a "moderate" to "high" amount of 
compression with the additional of light to moderate loads Some collapse of the soil 
occurred with the addition of water Some of the compression indicated by the 
consolidation tests is attributed to disturbance of the sample during sampling Results of 
the consolidation tests are presented of Figures 5 and 6 
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Siltv Gravel - The silty gravel contains clayey gravel layers It also contains cobbles and 
boulders up to approximately 2 feet in size and occasional boulders up to approximately 5 
feet in size It is medium dense to dense, moist and brownish gray to light brown in color 
Laboratory tests conducted on samples of the gravel indicate natural moisture contents 
range from 9 to 30 percent The results of gradation tests conducted on samples of the 
gravel are presented on Figure 7 
Laboratory test results are summarized on Table I and are included on the Logs of Exploratory Test 
Pits 
SUBSURFACE AND SURFACE WATER 
No free water was encountered in the exploratory test pits at the time of excavation We 
anticipate that the normal highest elevation of the seasonal high water table is at greater than 40 
feet below the ground surface No swamps, springs or seeps were observed at or adjacent the 
site 
PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION 
We understand that it is proposed to construct a single family PUD development in the northern 
portion of the property, approximately 8 acres in size It is proposed to construct a town home 
development in the southwestern portion of the property which is approximately 6 acres in size 
and a subdivision in the south-central and eastern portion of the property which is approximately 
21 acres in size Open space and park areas are planned for the central portion of the site 
We anticipate that roads extending through the property will generally have relatively light traffic 
volumes We have assumed traffic for the proposed roads consisting of 1 000 cars and 2 delivery 
trucks per day and 2 garbage trucks per week 
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If the proposed construction or traffic are significantly different from those described above, we 
should be notified to re-evaluate our recommendations 
GEOLOGIC CONSIDERATIONS 
A geologic hazard review of the site and vicinity was performed which included seismic, rock fall, 
landslide and debris f low hazards. 
Seismic Considerations 
1 • Surface Fault Rupture 
The closest fault trace of the Wasatch Fault is located approximately 300 to 400 
feet to the northeast of the east edge of the property No evidence of surface fault 
rupture can be identified at the property from field reconnaissance and aerial 
photograph review 
2. Ground Shaking 
The project is in an area which has a moderately high risk of experiencing strong 
ground shaking related to potential earthquake activity The site is located in 
Uniform Building Code Seismic Zone 3 We recommend that the buildings be 
constructed conforming to the Uniform Building Code Seismic Zone 3 standards 
using a soil profile type "S-2" 
3. Landslide Considerations 
Along the American Fork sub-segment of the Wasatch Fault Zone south of American 
Fork Canyon, the Manning Canyon shale is exposed in the lower part of the 
Wasatch range The shale is particularly susceptible to landslidtng, often 
incorporating large blocks of bedrock. Landslides of Holocene and Pleistocene to 
Late Tertiary age are prominent along the Wasatch Front from the American Fork 
Canyon to the Provo vicinity Several landslides have been identified along the fault 
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zone east of the property The landslides are of the Upper Pleistocene to Upper 
Tertiary time and appear to be associated with earthquake activity (Machette, 
1 989) Cluff and others have identified an area of 'possible landslide debris" which 
extends into the north corner of the property (Cluff and others, 1973) 
Reconnaissance of the site and review of aerial photographs do not indicate 
evidence of landslide at the property We feel that the relatively flat slopes present 
and the soil types encountered in the test pits excavated at the site indicate that 
landslide potential is minimal, if proper site grading practices are followed 
4. Debris Flow Considerations 
The property is located near the mouth of Dry Canyon which is a well-developed 
drainage having a well developed alluvial fan at its mouth The probability of debris 
f low originating from the drainage is dependant on the probability of an extreme 
climatic condition in combination with fire, drought or other damaging occurrences 
to the water shed There is a debris basin to the northeast of the site, up the Dry 
Canyon drainage approximately 1/3 mile The State of Utah Dam Safety Division 
was contacted to obtain information on the debris basin They indicate that the 
basin was constructed in 1984 to mitigate the risk of debris f low The basin has 
a crest height of 23 feet, a hydraulic height of 21 feet and a capacity of 11 acre 
feet The State of Utah indicated that a hydrologic analysis of the basin was 
conducted by RB&G Engineering and that a study of the basin by the State of Utah 
Dam Safety Division is to be conducted this year 
5 Collapsible Soil Considerations 
Collapsible soils are relatively dry, low density soils which undergo a decrease in 
volume when they become wet The decrease in volume may occur without change 
in applied pressure and the decrease in volume will increase with additional applied 
pressure These types of soils are generally found in arid to semi-arid environmental 
or associated with eohan deposits, alluvial fan deposits including mud flows and 
debris flows or with unconsolidated colluvial deposits 
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The collapse potential of the soils at the project site have been identified to be very 
low to high on a scale of very low, low, moderate, high and very high (Rollins and 
Owens, 1 988) Most of the property is within the area mapped as very low collapse 
potential The central portion of the site, along the Dry Canyon drainage, is mapped 
as moderate This ranking system is intended to alert the user or land owner to 
areas where collapsible soils are more likely to be found The potential for 
collapsible soils at the site was evaluated by wetting the samples during the 
consolidation tests Results of the consolidation tests indicate a moderate potential 
fcr collapse in the clay/silt soil with approximately 3 percent collapse occurring 
during wetting of the sample 
Most of the soils present within the study area consist of coarse granular soils 
which are typically not moisture sensitive However there appears to be localized 
at eas of collapsible soils We were not able to identify specific areas of concern due 
to the erratic nature of the clay and silt soils at the site With the known erratic 
occurrence, we suggest that the owners be aware of the potentially moisture 
sensitive soils in the area and that the excavation observations and drainage 
precautions contained in the geotechnical recommendations of this report be 
carefully followed 
6. Rock Fall 
Based on our site reconnaissance, there is one relatively small potential source of 
rock which could reach the site if it were dislodged from the hillside above The 
rock source is approximately 5 to 6 feet in diameter and is located approximately 
500 to 600 feet northeast of the northernmost drainage which extends through the 
site It is nearly in line with the north property boundary Based on our analysis, 
it is possible that rocks could roll from the rock source down through the 
northernmost drainage which extends through the Single Family PUD portion of the 
site 
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The rock source is relatively small and we anticipate that the rock fall hazard could 
be mitigated by removing the rock source or breaking the rock up to particles less 
than approximately 1 foot in size (which are not expected to reach the development 
area). Alternatively, a rock fail barrier could be provided at the top of the 
northernmost drainage above the Single Family PUD area. 
GEOTECHNICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the subsoil conditions encountered, laboratory test results, and the proposed 
construction, the following recommendations are given 
A. Site Grading 
We anticipate that only minor amounts of site grading will be required to construct the 
proposed development Cuts and fills may be required to facilitate construction in the 
northern and eastern portions of the property. 
1. Slopes 
Permanent cut slopes of up to 10 feet should be designed no steeper than 2:1 
(horizontal to vertical) Larger cuts should be considered on an individual basis. 
Fill slopes compacted to at least 90 percent of the maximum dry density as 
determined by ASTM D-1 557 near optimum moisture content and up to 10 feet high 
may be constructed on 2 1 (horizontal to vertical) Good drainage should be 
provided upslope of the fill 
Landscaping maintenance and surface protection may determine the most desirable 
slopes. 
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2. Excavation 
We anticipate that excavation at the site can be accomplished with typical 
excavation equipment Some difficulty can be expected when large boulders are 
encountered. 
3 Materials 
Materials placed as fill to support the foundations should be non-expansive granular 
soil. The on-site sand and gravel exclusive of any oversized material are suitable for 
use as structural fill. The clay and silt soils are not suitable for structural fil l, but 
may be used in landscaping or under pavement areas 
4. Surface Drainage 
With the moisture sensitive soils present at the site, it is important that in areas 
where moisture sensitive soils are encountered the following drainage precautions 
be observed during construction and maintained at all times after the residences 
have been completed 
a. Excessive wetting or drying of soils in foundation excavations should be 
avoided 
b. The ground surface surrounding the exterior of the residences should be 
sloped to drain away from the structures in all directions, maintaining a slope 
of at least 112 foot in 10 feet for a distance of at least 1 0 feet away from 
the buildings 
c. The upper 2 feet of foundation wall backfill should be low permeable clay 
soils 
d. Downspouts and drains should discharge well beyond the limits of all backfill 
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e. The sprinkler lines and sprinkler heads should not be placed within 10 feet 
of the foundation walls. 
B. Foundations 
1- Bearing Material 
With the proposed construction and the subsurface conditions encountered, we 
recommend that the foundations be supported on spread footings bearing on the 
natural soil or on compacted structural fill Compacted structural fill should extend 
down to undisturbed natural soils 
2. Bearing Pressure 
The consolidation test results indicate that the natural clay soils may undergo a 
moderate to high amount of compression on the addition of light to moderate loads. 
Based on this consideration, footings may be designed for an allowable net soil 
bearing pressure of 1,500 pounds per square foot. Footings should have a minimum 
width of 20 inches and a minimum depth of embedment of 1 foot Spread footings 
bearing on at least 2 feet of structural fill or 2 feet of the natural gravel soil may be 
designed using an allowable net bearing pressure of 2,500 psf 
3. Settlement 
We estimate that settlement will be on the order of 1 inch, if the residences are 
supported on the natural clay and silt soils It wetting of the foundation soil occurs, 
footing settlement could be significantly greater We estimate that settlement will 
be less than Vi inch for footings bearing on the natural gravel soil. 
4. Frost Depth 
Exterior footings and footings beneath unheated areas should be placed at least 30 
inches below grade for frost protection 
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5. Foundation Base 
The base of all excavations should be cleared of loose or deleterious material prior 
to fill or concrete placement 
6. Construction Observation 
A representative of the geotechnical engineer should observe all footing excavations 
prior to structural fill or concrete placement This is particularly important with the 
potential for moisture sensitive soils in the area 
C. Concrete Slabs-on-Grade 
1. Slab Support 
The concrete slabs may be supported on the natural soil or on compacted structural 
fill. 
2. Slab Joints 
A positive joint should be provided between the bearing wails and the floor slab to 
allow unrestrained vertical movement. 
3. Underslab Gravel 
A minimum 4 inch layer of free draining gravel should be placed beneath the slab 
D Subsurface Drains 
No free water was encountered ax the time of the investigation, however, the interlayered 
clay and gravel may result in perched water conditions, or highly permeable layers may 
transmit water to the subgrade portion of the buildings during times of rainfall or snow 
melt Consideration should be given to installing a permanent underdrain system for 
subgrade construction 
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The underdrain system should consist of peripheral drains on the below grade portion of the 
structures, leading to a sump where water can be removed by pumping or gravity flow 
The drain lines should consist of a perforated or open jointed pipe surrounded by free 
draining gravel The dram lines should be placed at least 18 inches below the floor level 
to provide free drainage of the water Three quarter inch washed rock or similar material 
would be satisfactory drainage gravel Drains should be connected to the gravel backfill 
and under slab gravel In crawl space construction, the ground surface should be sloped 
to drain into the underdrain 
E Water Soluble Sulfates 
Two samples of the natural soil were tested in the laboratory for water soluble sulfate 
content Results of the tests indicate that there is less than 0 1 percent water soluble 
sulfate in the soil. Based on the results of the test and published literature, the natural soils 
possess negligible sulfate attach potential on concrete No special cement type is required 
for concrete placed in contract with the natural soil Other conditions may dictate the type 
of cement to be used in concrete at the site 
F. Pavement 
Based on the subsoil conditions encountered, laboratory test results and the assumed 
traffic, the following pavement support recommendations are given 
1 Subgrade Support 
The near surface soil consists primarily of silty and clayey gravel with some silt and 
clay areas A California Bearing Ratio (CBR) of 3 and 20 percent was assumed in 
the analysis, which assumes a clay and gravel subgrade respectively 
2. Pavement Thickness 
Based on the subsoil conditions, anticipated traffic, methods presented by the Utah 
Department of Transportation and a design life of 20 years, a flexible pavement 
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section consisting of 3 inches of asphaltic concrete overlying 8 inches of base 
course may be used in clay subgrade areas The base course thickness could be 
reduced to 6 inches in gravel subgrade areas 
3. Pavement Material 
Pavement materials should meet the Utah Department of Transportation 
specifications for gradation and quality The pavement thickness indicated above 
assumes the base course is high quality material with a CBR of at least 80 percent. 
Other materials may be considered for use in the pavement section The use of 
other materials may result in different pavement material thicknesses 
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This report has been prepared in accordance with generally accepted geologic and geotechnical 
engineering practices in the area for the use of the client for design purposes The conclusions 
and recommendations included within the report are based on the information obtained from the 
test pits excavated at the location indicated on the site plan and the data obtained from laboratory 
testing Variations in the subsurface conditions may not become evident until additional 
exploration or excavation is conducted If the subsurface soil or groundwater conditions are found 
to be different than what is described in this report, we should be notified to re-evaluate the 
recommendations given 
APPLIED GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS, INC 
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NOTES 
1 Test pits were excavated on March 7 1997 with a t r ack excava to r 
2 Locations of test pi ts were m e a s u r e d approximate ly by pacing from fea tures 
shown on the si te plan 
2 Elevations of t es t pits were d e t e r m i n e d by in terpola t ing between con tou r s 
shown on the si te plan 
4 The tes t pit locations and e levat ions should be considered a c c u r a t e only to 
the degree implied by the me thod used 
5 The lines between the m a t e r i a l s shown on the tes t pit logs r e p r e s e n t the 
app rox ima te boundar ies between mate r i a l types and the t r ans i t ions may be 
g radua l 
Q No free water was e n c o u n t e r e d in t e s t pi ts a t the t ime of excavat ion 
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5355SS- REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
his Is a lagally blndtno contract Utah low requlros real estate [!censt>os to use this totm, Buyer and Seller, however, may agrfsa to altar or 
delate Its provisions op to U3<? a different form. H you desire logal or tax advice, consult y0gr attorney M tax ncMsar. 
,
 7 EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
Buyer, Jci^JMX^^—J=^I ^6=^±</. _ _ _ _ — _ offer^o purchase the Property 
described betow and hereby delivers to the Brokerage, as Earnest Money, the amount of %-JiJ^^^^Z^^z.t in the form 
o f - m _ _ y k ^ —Q^d^^ f^  _ which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as 
defined in Section 23), shall be deposited in accordance with state lav/. 
>3pAkz<<A ^2^^i^^^ _ on •Z*~2r/~0C4 
? (Si^ndlurfc 0/ pfl6filjj>wKer aekwrtvl<3dga& receipt of Earnest Money) (Dale) 
Brokerage:- O f J? fl\Q J^-fJ^4Z (jU^L, _ _ „ . Phone N u m b a r 2 a ^ l £ S S > 
/? / / , , 0F5?-R X0 PURCHASE^ . , / a /? !,Jltl_j£tLL-/^^ 
also described ^ s : , — / . . - . — — — — .... / / • y — • — • - • r ^ ^y^ / / ^—•• 
City o\^^U2L^'V> ...., -. County tA-JjtMX-^-. State of Utah, Z\p.&¥X2S4JzL-
1. PROPERTY: 
; i c 
^ ({he "Property'1) 
1.1 Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if presently owned and attached to 
the Property: plumbing, heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fens; water heater; built-in appliances; light 
fixtures end bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows; 
window blinds; ©wnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishos and system, permanently affixed carpets; automatic 
garage door opener and accompanying transmitters); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The fotovuing items shall also be 
included in this sale and conveyed undei separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: y ^ / / f f i ....,,. . , 
1.2 Excluded Items, The following items are excluded from this sale;. / l Z / 6 ^ — ~ - ,~, , ~ 
1,3 Water Rights. The faUowing water rights are included in this s a l e ; ^ ^ ^ S 
pii§JZi4i^^ - - - -
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for the Property is $ _ 
2^ 1 Method of Payment The Purchase Price will be paid as follows: 
%^JL^J/^)^' (a) Earnest Money Deposit Under certain conditions described in this Contract; THIS 
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. 
$ (b} New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new loan as provided in Section 2,3. Buyer will apply 
for one or more of the following loans: [ ] CONVENTIONAL [ ] FHA [ JVA 
[ ] OTHER (specify) . _ ^ ^ 
If an FHAA/A loan applies, see attached FHAA/A Loan Addendum. 
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and give details: 
[ ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS , , -
$ ~.. _ (c) Loan Assumption Addendum (See attached Assumption Addendum if applicable 
$
 m (d) Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable) 
S^^^-—^ (e) Other (specify), „ . 
%^J^L^^M/ (f) Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement 
%^L§S^JS^L PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (f) 
2.2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box) 
(a) [ ] Buyer's obligation to purchar7e the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable loan(s) 
referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (c) (the "Loan") This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition." 
(b) M Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan. Section 
2.3 does not apply 
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2 3 Application for Loan, 
(a) Buyer's duties. No later tu, n the Loan Application & Fee Deadline re'v need in Section 24(a) Buyer shall 
apply for the Loan "Loan Application" occurs only when Buyer has (I) completed, signed, and delivered to the 
lender (the "Lender*) the initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender, and (il) paid all loan 
application fees as required by the Lander Buyer agrees to diligently work to obtain tho Loan Buyer will promptly 
provide the Lender with any additional documentation as required by the I ender 
(b) Procedure if Loan Application is denied If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender 
does not approve the Loan (a "Notice of Loan Denial), Buyer shall, no later than three calendar days thereafter, 
provide a copy to Seller Buyer or Seller may, within three calendar days after Seller's receipt of such notice, 
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to the other party In the event of a cancellation under this Section 
2 3(b) (i) if the Notice of Loan Denial was received by Buyer no Inter than the Loan Denial Deadline referenced in 
Section 24(d), the Earnest Money Deposit shell be returned to Buyer, (d) if tho Notice of Loan Denial was received 
by Buyer after that date, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Seller and Seller agrees to accept as 
Seller's exclusive remedy the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages A failure to cancel as provided in this 
Section 2 3(b) shall have no effect on the Financing Condition set forth in Section 2 2(a) Cancellation pursuant to 
the provisions of any other section of this Contract shall be governed by such other provisions 
2.4 Appraisal Condition Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property [ 3 fSJ^IS NOT conditioned upon the Property 
appraising for not less than the Purchase Price This condition is referred to as the 'Appraisal Condition" If the 
Appraisal Condition applies and the Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Property has appraised for 
less than the Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Value') Buyer m?y cancel this Contract by providing a copy of 
such written notice \o Seller no later than three days after Buyors receipt of such written notice In the event of a 
cancellation under this Section 2 4 (i) if the Notice of Appraised Value was leceived by Buyer no later than the 
Appraisal Deadline referenced in Section 24(e), the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer, (u) if the Notice 
of Appraised Value was received by Buyer after that date, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Seller and 
Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages A failure to 
cancel as provided in this Section 2 4 shall be deemed a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Buyer Cancellation 
pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this Contiact shall be governed by such other provisions 
3, SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING, 
Settlement shall take place on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(f) or on a date upon which Buyer and 
Seller agree in writing "Settlement" shall occur only when all of the following have been completed (a) Buyer ^t\d Seller 
have signed and delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, by the 
Lender, by written esciow instructions or by applicable law, (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these 
documents (except for the proceeds of any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/dosing office 
in the form of collected or cleared funds, and (c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under these documents have 
been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected oi cleared funds Seller and Buyer 
shall each pay one-half (?) of the fee charged by the escrow/closing office for its services in the* settlement/closing process 
Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and interest on assumed obligations shall bp prorated at Settlement as 
set forth in this Section Tenant deposits (including, but not limited to, security deposits, cleaning deposits and prepaid 
rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement Prorations set forth in this Section shall be made as of the 
Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(f), unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parties Such 
writing could include the settlement statement The transaction will be considered closed when Settlement has been 
completed, and when all of the following have been completed (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered by 
the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/closing office, and (n) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded in the 
office of the county recorder The actions described in parts (i) and (n) of the preceding sentence shall be completed 
within four calendar days of Settlement 
4. POSSESSION, Seller shall deliver; physical possession to Buyer within [ ] hours [ )__ days after Closing; 
[}a Other (&p«Ify)^ JL&t ^M^tf^+ffi* . ™ . 
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8, TITLE INSURANCE, At Settlerne( Uller agrees to pay for a standard-cove, & owner's policy of title insurance 
insu'ring Buyer in the amount of the Purchase Price, Any additional title Insurance coverage shall be at Buyer's expense. 
SELLER DISCLOSURES, No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b), Seller shall 
provide to Buyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures": 
(a) a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller; 
(b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance; 
(c) a copy of any leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing; 
(d) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or 
zoning code violations; and 
(e) Other (specify) , ———. ™ _ 
8. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purchase 
underthis Contract (check applicable boxes). 
(a) P7 IS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7; 
(b) 1 I IS M IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property; 
(c) [ J IS fid IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor ("Survey"); 
(d) [ ] IS M IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the cost, terms and availability of homeowner's insurance ' 
' coverage for the Properly; 
(e) [ J18 ft<[IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the following tests and evaluations of the Property: (specify) 
If any of the above items are checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 0.4 apply, otherwise, they do 
not apply, The items checked in the affirmative above are collectively referre6 to as the "Evaluations & Inspections," Unless 
otherwise provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by 
individuals or entities of Buyer's choice, Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the 
walk-through inspection under Section 11. 
8.1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in 
lection 24(c) Buyer shall: (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections; and (b) determine if the Evaluations & Inspections 
are acceptable to Buyer. 
Z2 Right to Cancel or Object If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable, Buyer may, 
no later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller, 
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections, 
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline, Buyer does not, (a) cancel 
this Contract as provided in Section 8,2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections, 
the Evaluations & Inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer. 
8«4 Response by Seller, If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar 
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period") in which to agree in writing upon the manner of 
resolving Buyer's objections, Except as provided in Section 10.2, Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyer's 
objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in writing upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may 
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response 
Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer If this Contract is not canceled by Buyer under 
this Section 8.4, Buyer's objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer This waiver shall not affect those items warranted 
in Section 10, 
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There p<f ARE [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms Itthere 
are, the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference: [^'Addendum No. / 
[ ] Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum 
[ ] Lead-Based Paint Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this disclosure is required by law) 
[ ] Lead-Based Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by law) 
[ ] Other (specify) ™ ™ , 
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10/ SELLER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS, 
10.1 Condition of Title, Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property and wiil convey good and marketable 
Je to Bgyer gt Closing by general warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property subject to the 
oilowing matters of record: easements, deed restrictions, CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions and restrictions), and 
'ight$*-of-way; and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buyer under Section 8. 
Buyer el$a agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and not expiring prior to Closing 
Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and other $ervices 
provided to the Property after Closing, Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1(c), Seller 
will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and warrants. Seller 
wiil cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners association dues. 
10.2 Condition of Property, Seller warrants thai the Property will be in the following condition ON THE DATE 
SELLER DELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(a) the Property shall be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any.Seller or tenant moving-
related damage to the Property shall be repaired at Seller's expense, 
(bj the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances and fireplaces will 
be in working order and fit for their intended purposes; 
{&) the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller; 
(d) any private well or sceptic tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, and shall be in working order 
and fit for its intended purpose; and 
(e) the Property end improvements, Including the landscaping, will be in the same general condition as they were on 
the date of Acceptance. 
10.3 Home Warranty Plan. The "Home Warranty Plan" referenced in this Section 10.3 is separate from the warranties 
provided by Seller under Sections 10.1 and 10.2 above, (Check applicable boxes): A one-year Home Warranty Plan 
[ ] WJLL-KJWILL NOT be included in this transaction. If included, the Home Warranty Plan shall be ordered by f 3 Buyer 
f ) Seller and shall be issued by a company selected by [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller, The cost of the Home Warranty Plan shall 
nnt- PYr?FH?d $ -- and shall be paid for at Settlement by [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller, 
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION, Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time, 
conduct a ,lwalk-through" inspection pf the Property to determine only that the Property is "as represented," meaning thai 
the items referenced in Sections 1.1,8 4 and 10 2 ("the items") are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed, arid 
i the warranted condition, If the items are not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or repair 
ie items or, with the consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same. 
The failure to conduct a walkthrough inspection, or to claim that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a 
waiver by Buyer of the right to receive, on the date of possession, the items as represented. 
12. CHANCES DURING TRANSACTION, Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none 
of the following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer, (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made, 
(b) no new leases shall be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or 
undertaken; and (ci) no further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS, if Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or 
other entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and 
Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, 
constitutes the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, 
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by 
written agreement of the parties, 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
(oheck applicable box) 
t ]SHALL 
X J MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES 
first be submitted to mediation, If the parties agree to mediation, the dispute shall be submitted to mediation through 
a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties Each party agrees lo bear Us own costs of mediation. If 
mediation fails, the other procedures end remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 
shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation 
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16. DEFAULT, If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or 
to return it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Seller defaults, 
"n addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the 
arnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other 
remedies available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to 
Buyer upon demand, It is agreed that denial of a Loan Application made by the Buyer is not a default and Is governed by 
Section 2.3(b), 
17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the 
prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees shall not be awarded for 
participation in mediation under Section 15, 
18. NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, ail notices required under this Contract must be; (a) in writing, (b) signed 
by the party giving noiloe] and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable date 
referenced in this Contract. 
19. ABROGATION. Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1, 10,2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made in this 
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing, 
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property, Including physical damage or destruction to the Property or its 
improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall be 
borne by Seller until the transaction is closed. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE, Time is of the $z$&r\c& regarding the dates set forth in this Contract Extensions must 
be agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract; (a) performance under each 
Section of this Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 ?M Mountain Time on the stated date; 
and (b) the term "days'* shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which 
triggers the timing requirement (i.e.. Acceptance, Notice of Loan Denial, etc.), Performance dates and times referenced 
herein shall not be binding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as 
otheiwise agreed to in writing by such non-party. 
224 FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any 
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original. This 
ontract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed In counterparts, 
23. ACCEPTANCE, "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other; 
(a) signs the offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the 
other party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES, Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract 
(a) Loan Application & Fee Deadline „ _ _ (Date) 
(b) Seller Disclosure Deadline ffi," &I~~Q!J (Date) 
(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline (Date) 
(d) Loan Denial Deadline ™ _ (Date) 
(e) Appraisal Deadline /VIA- (Date) 
(f) Settlement Deadline ^ T W ~ U / _ _ _ (Date) 
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25, OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the P j2PJ{ ty£P^ above terms and conditions, 
~ Seller does not accept tills offer by; [ ] A M $ $ P M Mountain Time o n ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ v ^ a t e ) , this offer shail lapse; and 
& Brokerage shall return the,Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer, 
ntoyar'* Ttomatur*) (Offer Dele) ' (Buyer's Slpnatur*) ( ffer ste) » (Buyer's Signature) (Offer Dale) 
The later of the abovo Offer Detes shall be referred to as the "Offer Reference D a t e " 
(BuyiVs' Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (NoU^Addrele) (i i jTcod*) (Phono) 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
CHEW ONE; 
^VfACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE; Seller Accept the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions 
specified above, 
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's offer subject to the exceptions or 
modifications as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO 
(03(e) / " (Time) Ji (Sellers Signature) (Dale) (Time) 
(Suitors'Names) (PLEASE PRINT)f (J (J (Nolic* Addrftfii) (Zip Code) (Phone) 
[ J REJECTION: Seller Rejects the foregoing offer. 
Sailer's Si&natUffi) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
**A-*Urai*V»**- '<-6- i ' *k>^*****«' (*#4'**U**a'*- i«* '**-*^*- i / *^i* '4*^»**+A*( i .4(A^***W-ai**** i** 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Contract bearing all signatures, (Fill in applicable 
section below,) 
A I acknowledge receipt of a Snatf copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures: A, I ackno ledge recejpt of $pm copy of the foregoing I 
(buyer** Signature) (Dste) (Buyer'* ignature) ( ste) (Buyer's Signature) (Pete) 
(Seller's Si9nature) (Pete) 
B. I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be [ J faxed I ] mailed [ J hand 
delivered on, , (Date), postage prepaid, to the [ ) Seller [ 3 Buyer, 
Sent/Delivered by (specify) - , .. .^ 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 6, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVEO VERSIONS OF THIS FORM, 
J&Z$JGY Buyer's initials ^ < . ^ L Pate 3>/pt U^ page 6 of 6 pages Seller's Initials rf/il^ , Date. 
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ADDENDUM NO. 
TO 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
Page +«jL 
THIS IS AN [ V f ADDENDUM [ ] COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
an Offer Reldrence Date of .. , Including all prior Addendsfand counteroffers, between 
. as Buyer, and ^^b^y^l^.......AJ^^J^^^^A./~ as Seller, 
Jr^AA^a. yU&^if&rjfa The regarding the Property located..., ,«.„., .,., ,,,.. , 
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of theRtPC: 
' " " ^ & u S 
7/ y , si -JL--JL--JL--~ 
BUYER AND SELLER AGREE THAT THE COMPACT DEADLINES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC 
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): [ ] REMAIN UNCHANGED { 3 ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:, 
To the extent Ihe terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including all prior addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, Including all prior addenda and counteroffers, 
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ I Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until [ ]AM[ ] PM 
Mountain Time on _ (Date), to accept the terms of (his ADDENDUM in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 23 of the REPC Unless so accepfed, the offer as set forth in (his ADDENDUM shall lapse. 
(Date) (Time) [ ] Buyer ( ] Seller Signature (Date) 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
fel Buyer [ 3 Seller Signature 
CHBStfONE: 
[ vj ACCEPTANCE: [ v] Sailor [ ] Buysr hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM 
[ ] ^ COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO. 
(Time) 
(figntyufeV/ / (D&e)7 (Time) (Signature) 
'[ ) (REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM. 
(Date) (Time) 
(Signature) (Dale) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE ITT AH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL, 
EFFECTIVE AUGUSTS, 2003. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
TabC 
SELLER PROPERTY CONDITION D 
(LAND) 
kLUSURE 1SJ U3 
[LISTING A GENT Complete This Section QNLYJ 
SELLER NAME, -
PROPERTY ADDRESS / Tax I.I1# MW&f/f /?fld/~J5 C^^^uA^^ 
LISTING BROKERAGE -^%£g /°A/J. fifiaJOif ufivUL--, 
y W t h e "SELLER") 
. r ^ W e "PROPERTY1) 
2 .(the "COMPANY") 
[SELLER (ONLY) Complete and sign Remainder of Form] 
NOTICE TO SELLER. Each Seller Is obligated under law to disclose to the Buyer all known facts that materially or adversely affect the 
value of the Propertyand that are not readily observable. This disclosure statement is designed to assist the Seller In complying with 
these disclosure requirements and to assistthe Buyer in,evaluating the Property. The Company, and otherreal estate brokerages and 
agents will also rely upon the information contained in this disclosure statement 
NOTICE TO BUYER This is a disclosure of the Seller's knowledge of the condition of the Property as of the date signed by the Seller 
end is not a substitute for any inspections or warranties that the Buyer may wish to obtain. THIS IS NOT A WARRANTY OF ANY KIND 
BY THE SELLER. 
COMPANY REPRESENTATIONS REGARDING PROPERTY, The Company and its agents are (rained in the marketing of real estate. 
Neither the Company nor its agents are trained or licensed to provide the Buyer with professional advice regarding the physical 
condition of any property or regarding legal or tax matters. Accordingly, neither the Company nor any of its agents will make any 
representations or warranties regarding the physical or legal condition of the Property, including, but not limited to, the square footage, 
acreage, or the location of property lines, THE COMPANY AND ITS AGENTS STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT IN CONNECTION WITH ANY 
OFFER TO ACQUIRE THE PROPERTY, THE BUYER RETAIN THE PROFESSIONAL SERVICES Or LEGAL AND/OR TAX ADVISORS, 
PROPERTY INSPECTORS, SURVEYORS, AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS TO SATISFY THE BUYER AS TO ANY AND ALL ASPECTS OF 
THE PHYSICAL AND LEGAL CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY. 
1. UTILITY SERVICE 
I a. Does natural gas service* 
the Property? 
Yes 
[x 
No Unknown 
| b. Location of nearest gas line. 
j c4 Does publfc sewer service the 
Property? 
d. Location of nearest sewer line? 
j e. Is lhe Property approved for 
septic lank use? 
f, is there electrical service to 
j the Property? 
g, Location of naare$i electrical fin 
i * 
h. Is (here telephone service I 
to the Property? j 
X 
X 
e. j 
X 
i, Location of nearest telephone service line? 
I j . Is the Property assessed as I j 
Creenbelt? [ | xA 
2. LAND (CONT.) Yes 
| c. Are there wetlands on the ^ "1 
Property? | 
j d. Is the Properly located in a 
flood zone? 
j $. Do you know of any present or 
past drainage or flood problems 
affecting the Property? 
I f. Do you know of any encroach-
ments or boundary line dispute? I 
or easements affecting the 
[ Property? 
. I 
No 
>c 
>c 
X 
* j 
Unknown 
3. HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS 
Ar$ there any easting hazardous conditions on the Property, 
such as methane ga$, radio-active material, landfill, minesheft. 
to*!c materials? 
• Ye$ • No ^Unknown 
Have you had any environmental testing performed on the 
Property? QYes J%$"No 
4. OTHER MATTERS 
k. Have you received any notices 
by any governmental or quasi-
governmental agency adversely 
affecting the Property? 
X 
a. Is there any existing or threatened legal action affecting 
the Property? • Yes Vj^ fNo Q Unknown^  
b, Do you know of any violation of local, state, or federal 
laws or regulations relating to I he Property? 
QYes j g f t o 
2, LAND (SOILS, DRAINAGE AND BOUNDARIES) 
Yes No 
5 HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS 
Unknown 
j a. Is there any fill or expan$ive 
I soil on the Properly? 
b. Do you know of any sliding, 
settling or earth movement on 
the Property? i 
j , n • — - i i i i n ; 
X 
r i 
a. 15 the Property pari of a homeowners associations 
•Yes 1§£No Q Unknown If the answer to this 
question fs"No*, disregard the remainder of this section. 
b. Does the homeowners association levy assessments for 
maintenance of common areas and/or other common 
expenses? QjYes- iSffto Q Unknown 
Pa^ e 1 of 1 Seller's Initials S0). Pafe zMs^f Beer's Initials/?!L f^ Date^/ljfoy 
This form is licensed for use with Fanrmi lator1* Formi/sohSvare v3 0 80Q^33$-1027 
UARFormlOA2/$8 
Pr int * * On'Thurtdav AuauttGfl, 3002 $9 WW 
c* For any questions regarding the homeow^ Jassociatlon, 
contact: (if known) 
Name: _ _ ^ .. 
Address; __ _ ... 
^hona: ( _ )
 i ^ _ 
{Sailer authorizes ths re/ease to Buy$r regarding the 
condition of the Properly and current and future assessments. 
' " mt> • • fr«T—— i imi • n •» M I » H H H I • • , nm'>" m • mm .1 
d, Is there a Master/ ^sociation for the Property? IT yes, 
provide name ano\ itact person /or association on an 
addendum. 
6 WATER RIGHTS 
j a Are there any culinary water 
[ rights with the Property? 
o. Is $ culinary water source in 
place for the Properly? 
] c. Location of nearest culinary 
water line. 
d. Arc thera any irrigation 
1 water rights with the Property?^ 
a. Is there an irrigation water source 
and distribution facility In place 
for the Property such as canals, 
| ditches or pressurized system? | 
L Are there separate shares 
In a water company with tho 
! Properly? ]f ves. # of Shares 
Nama of Mutual Watar Company 
Ye$ 
^ 
xl 
No 
_ 
Unknown Water Right* 
Well, Spring, Water Company or 
Other Water Source 
X 
_ _ L 
/ 
. . 1 
IF TH£ ANSWER IS "YES" TO ANY OF THE QUESTIONS IN SECTIONS 1.K, 2,3 AND 5, (WHICH ARE SHADED), PROVIDE AN 
EXPLANA TION ON AN A TTA CHED A DDENDUM. 
is th&rs anything else which you should disclose to Buyer because it may materially or adversely affect the value or desirability of the 
Property, 
SELLER REPRESENTS THAT, TO THE BEST OF SELLER'S KNOWLEDGE, THE INFORMATION SET FORTH IN THE FOREGOING 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT IS ACCURATE AND COMPLETE. THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT IS NOT A WARRANTY OR GUARANTEE 
OF ANY KIND BY SELLER SELLER HEREBY AUTHORIZES THE COMPANY TO PROVIDE THIS INFORMATION TO PROSPECTIVE 
BUYERS AND TO REAL ESTATE BROKERS AND AGENTS- SELLER UNDERSTANDS AND AGREES THAT SELLER WILL NOTIFY THE 
COMPANY IN WRITING IMMEDIATELY IF ANY INFORMATION SET FORTH IN THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT BECOMES INACCURATE 
OR INCORRUPT IN ANY WAY. 
}/ffe*-> ^ ^ Pater ^ j / y Salter: Date; Seller: 
ANY^EPrte&NTATlONS REGARDING ACREAGE OF THE FROPERTY ARE APPROXIMATIONS ONLY. BUYER IS 
RESPONSIBLE TO VERIFY THE A OCURA GY OF SAID A PPROXIMA TE A CREA GE TO BUYER '$ SA TISFA CTION. FENCES MA Y 
NOT CORRESPOND WITH A CTUA L BOUND A RIE$ OF THE PROPER TY. 
RECEIPT AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF BUYER 
BUYER HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF A COPY OF THIS DISCLOSURE STATEMENT, BUYER FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGES 
THAT BUYER HAS BEEN ADVISED BY THE COMPANY TO SEEK COMPETEHT PPvOFESSIONAL ADVICE FROM PROPERTY INSPECTORS 
AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY AND WE DISCLOSURES CONTAINED 
HEREIN. BUYER FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT NEITHER THE COMPANY, NOR ANY OF ITS AGENTS, WILL MAKE ANY 
REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES REGARDING THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY OR REGARDING THE ACCURACY OF ANY 
STATEMENTS RELATING TO THE grONDJTION OF THE PROPERTY CONTAINED HEREIN. 
Buyer^L. 
 I    
^ Date zfedt LiU Bayer;, Date:. 
Page 2 of 2 
This form is licanssd for use with FormalcrfDc*re Forms Softwsro v3.0 . 300-335-1027 
UAR Form 10A2/98 
prlnUd On: Thor»d«y, Aupu*t 08, 2002 65:00.53 
TabD 
WAIL TAX NOTICE TO-
"Mark Hess 
O r e m , U T ZLi057 
Tvl-37633 
WARRANTY DEED 
III EHT 4 1 5 4 5 i 2 0 0 4 PB 1 of 1 1
 RANDALL A . COVINGTON 
UTAH COUNTY RECORDER 
E004 Apr 13 2 i M M FEE 10,00 BT SFS 
RECORDED FOR HQlfHTfllN WEST TITLE CO 
CANBERRA DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, L.C. 
of SALT LAKE CITY, County of SALT LAKE, State of UTAH 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to 
GRANTORCS 
Mark Hess and Marilyn Hess, husband and wife, as joint tenants 
GRANTEE(S 
of OrZW , County of U+aM , State of Uhah 
for die sum of TEN DOLLARS AND OTI-IER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION 
the following tract of land in UTAH, STATE OF UT, to-wit 
Lot 41 , Plat "B", CANBERRA HEIGHTS SUBDIVISION, Lindon, Utah, according to ihe 
official plat thereof on file in the Office of the County Recorder, Utah County, Utah. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor, this 1st day of April, 2004 
'PtfrWnt Company, 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY O F Utah 
:ss ) 
On the 1st day of Apr i l , 2004, personally appeared before-me, a notary-public in and for the State 
of Utah, PfWiO 0*. A l i e n and manager of Canberra 
Development Company, L . C , a Utah Limited Liability Company, the signers of the above 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that they have authority to execute the within and 
foregoing instrument in behalf of said limited liability company, and that said limited liability 
company executed the same. 
~ L0RAINE1EE VHA^V^^ iy 
%> Wm P « « m i l «f t [ M J { ] ^ ^ o m i n i s s i o n Exp 
m
 961 8, OREM BLVD. ^ ~ — • -
ires: 
• OREM, UTAH 84058 
COMM. EkPIRES 1-24-2008 
Residing in: UTPtiJ doawTW 
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